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ABSTRACT
This article develops a theory of legpl evolution that links private
property right allocations in intellectual property goods to changes
in economic values arising from developing technology. Rather
than simply rsulting from interest group prssure and rentseeking the emergence of intellectual property rights is best
described as a response to increasing economic value and
diminishing transaction costs, resulting from synergies betwen
new technologies and intellectual content. In this process of legal
change in intellectual property, the inherent uncertainty as to the
usefulness of technology in protecting content leads to increased
efforts of legislative and judicial capture by both content providers
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and consumers. The resulting social mechanism predicts a back and
forth of the legal allocation of use rights between producers and
users.
As a matter of allocative efficiency, however, there exists
considerable friction between the "multi-component" or
complementary nature of wrks and the continued extension of
property right-protection to increasingly smaller units of intellectual
and scientific creation As an economic model of fragmentation
demonstrates, the uncoordinated exercise by right holders of their
exclusion rights might lead to sub-optimal levels of production. In
light of this, doctrines of fair use, blocking patents, equivalent
patents, and generic trademarks serve as important points of
moderation of the deadweight losses that might ensue when
dealing with the uncoordinated exercise of control rights over
complementary property rights.
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INTRODUCTION

With the Supreme Court's decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft, the issue of the
expanding boundaries of intellectual property law emerges once again as a topic of wide
debate. In Eldred, a 7-2 majority of the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity
of the Copyright Term Extension Act ("CTEA"), also known as the "Sonny Bono Act"
or "Mickey Mouse Act." 2 Brushing aside free speech issues,3 the Court noted that
1.
The Act was dedicated to the memory of pop singer and Republican Congressman Sonny Bono,
who died in a skiing accident at Lake Tahoe. The author of "I Got You Babe" was a firm supporter of
perpetual copyright laws. Congress increased the term of copyright protection by twenty years, and
honored Sonny Bono by naming this legislation after him. However, the members of Congress "also
rejected many of the amendments he had offered, establishing that there are limits on the type of
sentimentality they are willing to engage in." Symposia, The Constitutionality of Copyright Term

Extension: How Long is Too Long?, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651, 651 (2000).
2.
The Act is also informally referred to as the "Mickey Mouse Act" because of the involvement of
the Walt Disney Company. For Disney, the CTEA extension was timely as it prevented the first "Mickey
Mouse" cartoons, such as "Steamboat Willy," from entering the public domain. The Walt Disney Company
and the Hollywood film industry lobbied hard to clear the CTEA through Congress. Disney handed
contributions to eight of the Senate bill's 12 sponsors and to 10 of the House bill's 13 sponsors. The
National Republican Senatorial Committee received $20,000 in unrestricted "soft money" following a visit
by Disney Chairman Michael Eisner to Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott. See Daren Fonda, Copyright
Crusader,THE BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 29, 1999. Helped in part by Europe's recent harmonization to the
term of life plus 70 years, and the commotion surrounding the Staff report, the Act passed relatively
unnoticed through Congress. However, popular backlash followed shortly. See, e.g., Jan McPherson,
Copyright Becomes a Tool of the Cartels, NETNAcs, Oct. 2002, available at http://www.netnacs.corn
downunder/archive/du-0016.htm; John Naughton, Mickey Mouse Threatens to Block All Ideas in Future,
THE
OBSERVER,
Feb.
24,
2002,
available at
http://www.observer.co.uk/business/story/

0,6903,655907,00.html.
3.
The majority opinion of the Supreme Court held that when Congress has not altered the
traditional contours of copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary. For a critical
review of the First Amendment issues in Eldred, see the Web blog of Yale Law School Professor Jack M.
Balkin, Mickey in Chains, Part II, or Why the Court Got It Wrong in Eldred v. Ashcroft (Jan. 15, 2003), at

http://balkin.blogspot.com/2003_01_12_balkin-archive.html#87500874.
According to Balkin, the
expansion of intellectual property laws (including "horizontal" aspects such as derivative rights, contraction
of fair use, etc.) has shrunk the built-in First Amendment protections, creating the need for heightened
scrutiny, also on a vertical level (such as the duration of copyright protection). Balkin concludes that "[i]n
the Court's eagerness to get rid of the first amendment claims in this case, it has created truly bad law that
will cause problems for freedom of expression for many years to come. This is simply a disastrous opinion
for free speech, and the Court should be ashamed of the shoddy job it's done in this case." See also
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demographic and technological reasons, as well as the importance of harmonization with
European copyright laws, provide a rational basis for adding 20 years to the copyright life
of authored works. Eldred illustrates the overarching trend that has occurred over the past
few decades: an expansive assignment of rights in previously unregulated intellectual
property material.
Economic analysis, with its concern for efficiency, has long provided the
overarching rationale for monopoly rights as a foundation of intellectual property
systems: the investments of authors and investors require legal protection because works
of intellectual property are so easily reproduced.4 Yet, economic analysis itself yields
fundamental criticism of the expanding path of property rights protection that intellectual
property law has taken as of late.5 In documenting the social, economic, and political
processes that underlie legal change in intellectual property, this article illustrates the
fundamental nexus between technological progress and intellectual property. In doing so,
Symposium, Eldred v. Ashcroft: Intellectual Property, Congressional Power, and the Constitution, 36
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1 (2002); Symposia, The Constitutionalityof Copyright Term Extension: How Long is

Too Long?, supra note 1 (including appellants' reply brief at 655). On copyright and First Amendment
issues, see generally C. Edwin Baker, FirstAmendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891 (2002);
Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: FirstAmendment Constraintson Enclosure of the Public
Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); Marci A. Hamilton, Copyright at the Supreme Court: A
Jurisprudenceof Deference, 47 J. Cop. Soc'Y 317 (2000); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of
Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998); Neil W. Netanel,
Locating Copyright Within the FirstAmendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. Rev. 1 (2001); Jed Rubenfeld, The
Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1 (2002). On the future of
constitutional law and copyright, see Pamela Samuelson, The ConstitutionalLaw of Intellectual Property

After Eldred v. Ashcroft, 50 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 547 (2003).
4.

See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J.

LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989).
5.
See, e.g., Richard Posner's criticism on the expansion of intellectual property law: "These rights
keep expanding without any solid information about why they're socially beneficial." Declan McCullagh,
Left

Gets

Nod from

Right

on

Copyright Law,

CNET

NEws.coM,

Nov.

20,

2002,

at

http://news.comcom/2100-1023-966595.html. The CTEA's extension of copyright duration to existing
copyrighted work is one such focal point of the economist's skepticism. Because one "cannot give extra
incentives to a corpse," economic reasoning falls short in providing a rationale for this aspect of the CTEA.
In the words of Lessig, "Gershwin isn't going to write more music." Steven Levy, Lawrence Lessig's
Supreme

Showdown,

WIRED

MAG.,

Oct.

2002,

available

at

http://www.wired.com/

wired/archive/10.10/lessig-pr.html. Similarly, with regard to future works, the extra incentives created by
the CTEA are negligible. At an interest rate of 7%, the present value of every dollar in extra royalties in
those 20 years ranges from $0.0045 in year eighty to $0.0012 in year one hundred. See Brief of Amici
Curiae George A. Akerlof et al. at 6, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618). The brief was
composed by seventeen prominent economists, of which five received the Nobel Prize in Economic
Science. The brief also refers to the concept of anticommons fragmentation. Id. at 13. This issue is
addressed further in Part III of this article. For a list of the various amici in Eldred, see Berkman Center for
Internet & Society, Openlaw: Eldred v. Ashcroft, at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/eldredvreno/legal.html.
Moreover, the CTEA has salient distributional and political economy effects. The life cycles of authored
work are of such nature that of all works created 70 years ago, 2% of those works account for all revenue of
incoming royalties. If the CTEA duration of protection had been in force at the time of the creation of the
Santa Clause figure, every department store would today still pay royalties come Christmas time. A Web
site has recently listed all renewals of classic 1923 books that are now kept out of the public domain by the
CTEA.

See U.S. Catalog of Copyright Entries (Renewals), at http://www.kingkong.demon.co.uk/

ccer/ccer.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2003).
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I set out three basic claims on the process of legal change in intellectual property.
First, rather than simply resulting from interest group pressure and rent-seeking,
the emergence of intellectual property rights is best described as a response to increasing
economic value and diminishing transaction costs, resulting from synergies between new
technologies and intellectual content. Second, the uncertainty as to the usefulness of
technology in protecting or copying content leads to increased efforts of legislative and
judicial capture by both content providers and consumers. The resulting social
mechanism predicts a cyclical back and forth of the legal allocation of use rights between
producers and users. Third, as a matter of allocative efficiency, there exists considerable
friction between the "multi-component" or complementary nature of works and the
continued extension of property right protection to increasingly smaller units of
intellectual and scientific creation. Economic theory reveals the problematic societal
consequences that may develop in the wake of unbounded fragmentation of property
rights.
This paper links the property rights evolution in the realm of intellectual or
information goods to the synergy between technological advancements and intellectual
property. The expansion of intellectual property law is one of higher property activity,
situated mainly in terms of more "precision" in the allocation of the various novel uses of
intellectual goods. Rather than simply entailing a one-way distribution of rights to
producers as an interest group, the evolution of intellectual property rights can be
identified as a progression toward a more explicit assignment of rights in previously
unregulated material. Overall, users and consumers have been granted more limited but
also more explicitly specified rights of use and defense with regard to intellectual
resources. Albeit deterministic, my rationalization of the process of intellectual property
law formation is not optimistic in nature. As a matter of allocative efficiency, this article
provides a cautionary note with regard to the degree of fragmentation resulting from the
ongoing creation of property rights specifications in intellectual property.
Part II discusses the gradual expansion of intellectual property over time. It is held
that the increased role of property rights allocation in society's conception of intellectual
goods responds to changing underlying structural conditions. I illustrate how the
evolution of digital technology and intellectual property rights fits the textbook example
of the emergence of "property rights" in the presence of increasing economic value and
diminishing transaction costs. Part II concludes with a description of the social
mechanism by which change in intellectual property law takes shape. Part III explores the
possible societal ramifications of the proliferation of intellectual property rights in
relation to the economic concept of property fragmentation. This Part underscores the
friction between the "multi-component" or complementary nature of works and the
continued extension of property right-protection to increasingly smaller units of
intellectual and scientific creation. I explore fragmentation and complementarity (and the
presence of institutional safeguards) with regard to the three main intellectual property
rights: copyrights, patents, and trademarks. The analysis is extended to a number of
current issues in the field of intellectual property, where property rights protection has
been established in areas that were previously considered to be beyond the confines of
intellectual property law. This article demonstrates that, as a matter of allocative
115
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efficiency, the economic model of fragmentation is crucial to many of the contemporary
issues of intellectual property law. These contemporary issues include the emergence of
patents on genetic information, the validity of business patents, the scope of antitrust law
for the regulation of the practices of copyright associations, the justification of copyright
defense doctrines, the case for unrestricted automated rights management systems, and
several other current issues in the intellectual property policy debate.
II.

THE PROLIFERATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

A. Introduction
If one was pressed to describe the history of intellectual property law6 in one
word, it would not be hard to do. The word that comes to mind is "expansion." 7 Statutory
and adjudicatory law-making initiatives have steadily resulted in the creation of new
intellectual property rights and the extension of existing doctrines of intellectual property
rights to subject matter previously outside of the grab of intellectual property law.8
6.
In this chapter, intellectual property is defined as "nonphysical property which stems from, is
identified as, and whose value is based upon some idea or ideas. Furthermore, there must be some
additional element of novelty." Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287,

294 (1988).
7.
See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, revised at
Stockholm on July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305; Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, revised at Paris on July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S.
221. The international intellectual property system was recently strengthened and broadened by the
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, whose intellectual property component, the "TRIPS"
agreement, builds on the Paris and Berne Conventions. See Final Texts of the GATT Uruguay Round
Agreements Including the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement]. See generally SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886 TO 1986 (1987); MIHALY FICSOR, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND THE
INTERNET: THE 1996 WIPO TREATIES, THEIR INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION (2002). On an
international level, provisions of "national treatment" (providing identical rights to nationals of another
Member State are as granted to one's own nationals) and "most-favored-nation treatment" (in which
privileges granted by one Member State to another state must be granted to all other WTO Member States)
have added to the expansion of intellectual property rights. See TRIPS Agreement, supra, at arts. 3 and 4,
respectively. In the European Union, the harmonization of national Member State laws, as a matter of
procedure, has added to the strengthening of intellectual property rights in Europe. As Justice Lenaerts
explained, the European Commission's harmonizing "up" (extension of protection) rather than "down" is a
natural result of the legislative process: "It is much easier to harmonize intellectual property rights up than
down. No one minds being given more rights than they had before, whereas people are apt to complain
very seriously - raising cries of destruction of property without compensation - if their rights are cut
down." Justice Robin Jacob, The Stephen Stewart Memorial Lecture: Industrial Property - Industry's
Enemy?, [1997] INTELL. PROP. Q. 3, 8 (cited in GUY TRITTON, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN EUROPE 325
n.68 (2002)). For more on theories of legal change, see infra Part II.C. On the international political process
of copyright treaty-making, see generally M.M. BOGUSLAVSKII, COPYRIGHT IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS: INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC WORKS (1979).
8.
See EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE
KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001). With regard to patents, the expansion
has opened entirely "new landscapes ... to the possibility of patents." Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six
Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14
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In the words of a leading commentator of intellectual property law: "There is
currently a strong trend to 'propertize' everything in the realm of information. Intellectual
property law is expanding on an almost daily basis as new rights are created or existing
rights are applied to give intellectual property owners rights that they never would have
had in an earlier time." 9
This trend stretches across the entire domain of intellectual property rights,
adjusting the boundaries of copyright law,10 patent law," trademark law, 12 and the
enactment of sui generis or special purpose intellectual property laws, including the
protection of semiconductor chips, of gathered information in the form of databases, 14

BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 579 (1999) [hereinafter Merges, Six Impossible Patents]. The patentability of

software and business methods has made the "impossible" possible, according to Merges. Id. at 581.
9.

Mark Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEx. L. REV. 873, 898-99

(1997) (book review) [hereinafter Lemley, Romantic Authorship]. Lemley illustrates the expansion frenzy
in reference to the National Basketball Association's copyright claims in the scores of its games, copyright
claims in architecture of homes, and trademark infringement claims of property owners against postcards of
city skylines. See also Robert P. Merges & Glenn H. Reynolds, The Proper Scope of the Copyright and
Patent Power, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 45, 45 (2000): "As an increasing amount of society's wealth is tied up

in intangible assets, strong, clear property rights can make a good deal of sense. But it is also possible to
have too much of a good thing, and our society is in danger of reaching that point." The authors hold that
there are internal, teleological limits on the power of Congress to create and extend intellectual property.
With regard to copyrights, Elkin-Koren notes, "[I]f copyright law had once created islands of information,
which are subject to the sovereign control of copyright owners, these islands are now turning into a
continent leaving little available space in between." Niva Elkin-Koren, It's All About Control: Rethinking
Copyright in the New Information Landscape, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 79, 84 (Niva

Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel eds., 2002).
10.

See infra Part II.A.1.

11.
See infra Part II.A.2.
12.
See infra Part II.A.3.
13.
Semiconductor chips were awarded protection in the United States under the Semiconductor Chip
Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-912. (Supp. IV 1986).
14.

Although Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363-64 (1991), limits

copyright protection in factual compilations, the developments thereafter have awarded stronger protection
to database works. See J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50
VAND. L. REV. 51 (1997); Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Ri hts and the New Institutional
Economics, 53 VAND L REV 1857,.1873-75 & nn.52-55 (2000)
Merges, New Institutional1hereinafter

Economics[ (citing Bloomberg's efforts to fend off attempts by database owners to receive stronger
intellectual property rights on stock and commodity pricing); Shawn Zeller, From the K Street Corridor:
Raw Data, 30 NAT'L J. 3028 (Dec. 19, 1998). See also TRIPS Agreement supra note 7, at art. 10 (stating
that databases are protected "by reason of the selection or arrangement of their contents"). A similar trend
has emerged in countries of the European Union. See Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20 [hereinafter
Database Directive]. The format, ordering and presentment of a database are covered by copyright law. The
content of the database is not covered by copyright law, but might receive sui generis protection. See, e.g.,
Art Research & Contact v. B.S., Belgian Cass. (Cour de Cassation May 11, 2001) (No. C.00.0391.N),
accessible at http://www.cass.be/cgi juris/jurf.pl. However, introductory summaries of case law in legal
databases are protected by copyright law. (Vrz. Rb. Brussel, July 28, 2000). See generally Belgian Law of
Aug. 31, 1998, Implementing the European Directive of March 11, 1996, on the Legal Protection of
Databases (B.S., Nov. 14, 1998), accessible at http://www.juridat.be/cgiloi/legislation.pl.
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industrial designs, and plant varieties. Such expansion implicates all but the most basic
tenets of society: news, information, scientific data,16 entertainment, and technology.

1. Copyright Law: Creators and Artists at the Wheel
Over the past two hundred years of copyright history, numerous statutory17 and
adjudicatory adjustments have, almost without exception, resulted in an expansion of the
legal protection of authorship.
Copyright 8 law duration has expanded from a renewable fourteen-year term to
life of the author plus seventy years after death. 19 The limit of what is defined as
copyrightable content is continually being readjusted through moderations of the
threshold of originality,20 and of other authorship requirements.21 Copyright now protects
sound recordings as distinct from the underlying musical compositions. 22 The control
15.

This applies uniquely to the United States. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Information Products:

A Challenge to Intellectual Property Theory, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 897 (1988).

16.

In observing the increased erosion of the public domain, Robert Merges writes of "creeping

propertization" in the pure sciences. See Robert P. Merges, PropertyRights Theory and the Commons: The
Case of Scientific Research, in SCIENTIFIC INNOVATION, PHILOSOPHY, AND PUBLIC POLICY,

13

Soc. PHIL.

& POL'Y 145, 147 (Summer 1996) [hereinafter Merges, Property Rights Theory and the Commons]. See
also ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE (1997)
[hereinafter MERGES, NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE].

17.
For an overview, see Jessica Litman, CopyrightLegislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L.
REV. 275 (1989) [hereinafter Litman, CopyrightLegislation].

18.
Copyright law covers a diverse subject-matter: novels, plays, symphonies, paintings, computer
programs, sound recordings, film, live performances, broadcastings, cable transmissions, etc. In this
article, I refer to all of these non-invention creations as "authored works" or "copyrighted material."
19.
In the United States, the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1994), replaced the renewable
fourteen-year term (which dated to the first copyright statute, the Statute of Anne; see Act for the
Encouragement of Learning, 1710, 8 Anne, c. 19 (Eng.)) with the broader "life of the author plus 50 years"
rule. The Sony Bono Copyright Term Extension Act harmonized the copyright term with the European
Union standard of 70 years after death of the author. Sony Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 17 U.S.C.
§ 302 (2000). Cf Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993 Harmonizing the Term of Protection of
Copyright and Certain Related Rights, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9. The directive was implemented in the national
legislation of EU Member States; see, e.g., Law of June 30, 1994, Belgian Act on Copyright Law and
Related Rights, art. 2, § 1 (B.S., July 27, 1994).
20.
On the development of a lower standard of originality, see Ryan Littrell, Toward a Stricter
OriginalityStandardfor Copyright Law, 43 B.C. L. REV. 193, 196-205 (2001) (discussing the relevant case

law). Littrell links the lowered standards of copyright protection to the rise of a romantic conception of
authorship. However, a more romantic conception of authorship could also suggest that standards of
originality would be stricter. Before creativity is awarded the esteemed status of "authorship," it must be of
a nature that sets it apart from the rest of society's productive activities. See Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory
of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship," 1991 DUKE L.J. 455 (1991).
21.
On the erosion of the formal standards for copyright, see MERGES, NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE,

supra note 16, at 345-51.
22.
In the United States, see 17 U.S.C. § 106(6). The Rome and Phonograms conventions originally
extended copyright to performers, producers of phonograms and broadcasters. See International Convention
for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations, Oct. 26, 1961,
496 U.N.T.S. 44; Geneva Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized
Duplication of Their Phonograms, Oct. 29, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 309. At the time, the main concern was with
protection of performers against "bootlegging" activities: the fixation and broadcasting of performances
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rights of copyright owners over the use of their work have been bolstered, such as in the
evolution of performance rights in copyrighted work, 23 and the global convergence
towards inalienable moral rights in copyrighted work.24 The sphere of copyright law has
expanded with each wave of technological advancement. 25 The most recent example is
the applicability of copyright law to the digital renditions of intellectual content and the
novel means of communicating that information, as implemented by the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act and the European Union Information Society Directive.26 The
without consent, as well as the reproduction of such fixations. See also WIPO Performers and Phonograms
Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, art. 5, available at http://www.wipo.int/eng/diplconf/distrib/95dc.htm (extending the
moral rights of attribution and integrity to performers of live "aural" performances and phonogram
recordings). See also id. at art. 6 (bolstering the economic rights of performers, defining them as the
"exclusive right of authorizing").
23.
See Lemley, Romantic Authorship, supra note 9, at 887, with reference to Copyright Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 106, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1994)). With regard to public
performance of sound recordings through digital means, see Digital Performance Right in Sound
Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995). The Digital Performance Right in
Sound Recordings Act of 1995 establishes an exclusive right to perform sound recordings publicly by
means of a digital audio transmission, and introduces a royalty right for digital performances, downloading,
uploading and streaming of digital transmissions. See 17 U.S.C. § 114.
24.
For an in-depth comparative discussion of this trend, see Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions
and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (1994); see also id. at 2-3 nn.7-10 (referring to adjudicatory innovations in the

recognition of moral rights in copyrighted work). For an economic explanation of moral rights, see Henry
Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors' and Artists' Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic
Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95 (1997). Moral rights in Europe include, for example, Law of June 30, 1994,

Belgian Act on Copyright Law and Related Rights, art. 2, § 1 (B.S., July 27, 1994). Article 1, § 2 prescribes
non-alienable moral rights of attribution, public divulgement, and non-modification.
25.

For an overview, see, e.g., Maureen Ryan, Cyberspace as Public Space: A Public Trust Paradigm

for Copyright in a Digital World, 79 OR. L. REV. 647, 719 (2000): "recent trends in copyright policy as
applied to the digital environment have resulted in a trend toward an unwarranted privatization of
cyberspace and the information that flows through it." For a discussion of legislative concerns with
intellectual property protection in the digital era, see European Commission, Green Paper on Copyright
and the Challenge of Technology, COM (88) 172.

26.
The NII White Paper, developed under the Clinton Administration, is a prime example of this
trend. See Information Infrastructure Task Force, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Intellectual Property and the
National Information Infrastructure: The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights 2

(1995), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/front.pdf. Likewise in Europe, see
Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the
Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, 2001 O.J.
(L 167) 10 [hereinafter European Union Information Society Directive]. The Information Society Directive
harmonizes European copyright laws in the world of digital network and e-commerce. The directive
extends the rights of copyright holders to digital communication. See id. at art. 3(1): "Member States shall
provide authors with the exclusive right to authorize or prohibit any communication to the public of their
works, by wire or wireless means, including the making available to the public of their works in such a way
that members of the public may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them." The
European Union Information Society Directive introduces a new "production right." See id. at art. 2: "the
exclusive right to authorize or prohibit, direct or indirect, temporary or permanent reproduction by any
means or in any form, in whole or in part." This right of production intends to cover all types of electronic
and transient copying, especially online and digital acts of reproduction and dissemination. This new
production right is not limited by a "substantiality" threshold - such as in the European Database Directive,
where a minimum amount of information must be copied before the right of the database owner is
infringed. Database Directive, supra note 14, at art. 7(1). The Information Society Directive also bolsters
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prohibition of circumvention technology 27 and the judicial validation of shrinkwrap
contracts can be viewed in light of this. 28 The curtailment of the doctrine of fair use in the
the right of authors who have explicit right to authorize or prohibit the communication to the public of
"any" communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless means. European Union
Information Society Directive, supra, at art. 3. This "making available" right is another step in the direction
of enclosure of new technological uses of content.
27.
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act creates a new species of copyright protection, also called
"paracopyright," that prohibits not copying itself but the creation of various devices and technologies that
might be used to facilitate copying by circumventing copyright management devices. 17 U.S.C. § 12011205 (2000). In doing so, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act introduces a considerable extension of
copyright protection by rendering illegitimate the technological tools that might act to circumvent copy
protection (§ 1201), while also acknowledging the legitimacy of technical protection schemes (§ 1202). In
effect, these "anticircumvention" provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act change the terms of
the traditional "arms" race between copy protection and circumvention. "Once adopted by a right holder,
these technological self-help means are no longer vulnerable to circumventing technologies because these
technologies are now prohibited by law." Elkin-Koren, supra note 9, at 84. A similar restriction on
circumvention technology is introduced in the European Union by Article 6 of the Information Society
Directive. European Union Information Society Directive, supra note 26. See also WIPO Copyright
Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, arts. 11-12., 36 I.L.M. 65 (ordering contracting states to take measures against the
circumvention of "effective technological measures" that restrict unauthorized acts in relation to protected
works and against unauthorized removal of "electronic rights management information"). These
prohibitions on circumvention are not absolute. In the American context, see Jane C. Ginsburg, How
Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 61 (2002) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Bad Name]

(noting the DMCA contains institutional safeguards that allow courts to interpret the legislation so as to
prevent overreaching). In the European Union, Article 6(4) of the Information Society Directive mandates
that the fair uses listed in the directive (under Article 5(2)(a), 5(2)(c)-(e), 5(3)(a)-(b) and 5(3)(e)) should
remain intact so that the beneficiary of the defense retains access to the material protected by automated
rights management devices. The problem with such a detailed rule is that it provides no protection to
defenses that are not mentioned in Article 6(4). See TRITTON, supra note 7, at 371.
28.
In ProCD,it was first held in the United States that shrinkwrap licenses, which allegedly contract
for restrictions on the "re-use" of copyrighted information, are enforceable. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,
86 F.3d. 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). For a comprehensive review of the debate surrounding ProCD and the
larger issues at stake in shrinkwrap contracts, see Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and
Copyright in the Digital Age, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1025 (1998). According to Madison, ProCD goes

beyond the enablement of "intellectual property owners to use contract norms to create a formal private
property right that exceeds the public rights provided by the Copyright Act"; it also "shap[es] our
conventional understandings regarding copyright and information rights." Id. at 1029-31. For literature
favorable to property and freedom of contract in the digital context, see, e.g. Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs.
Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L.
REV. 557 (1998); Charles Clark, The Publisher in the Digital World, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE KNOWRIGHT '95 CONFERENCE, at 85 (Klaus Brunnstein &

Peter Paul Sint eds., 1995); Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
217 (1996); Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual PropertyRights and Collective
Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996) [hereinafter Merges, Contractinginto Liability Rules];
Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the "Newtonian" World of OnLine Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115 (1997); Maureen A. O'Rourke, CopyrightPreemption After
the ProCD Case: A Market-Based Approach, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53 (1997); Maureen A. O'Rourke,
Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract: Copyright Preemption of Software License
Terms, 45 DuKE L.J. 479 (1995); William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-

KENT L. REV. 1203 (1998) (arguing for an enabling treatment that is sensitive to the public interest). For a
critique, see, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights

Management," 97 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1998) (arguing the current approach of private contracting reflects
an outdated, overly narrow view of economic regulation by government); Dennis S. Karjala, Federal
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presence of online licensing initiativeS29 and automated rights managemento further
illustrates the expansion of copyright law into the digital realm.3 1
2. Patent Law: Inventors as Entrepreneurs
The evolution of patent law is characterized by a similar shift toward increased
"propertization." The range of the patent system has expanded exponentially over the
past fifty years.32 Patents are being issued for subject matter previously considered
beyond the confines of patentability. Software patents, genetic information,34 and the
Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 DAYTON L. REV. 511 (1997) (arguing that given their
uniformity such licenses are equivalent to private legislation); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the
Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089 (1998) (validating electronic private ordering

but holding that Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code "shift[s] the burden of initiating litigation to
the licensee, who in many cases will be poorly equipped to bear it" and should be invalidated via principles
of preemption and freedom of speech). For a critique on the latter, see David. E. Friedman, In Defense of
Private Orderings: Comments on Julie Cohen's "Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help," 13
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1151 (1998) (arguing freedom of contract and the technologies of digital monitoring
and self-enforcement allow producers to better create legally adequate contracts in a mass market context).
29.
See Ben Depoorter & Francesco Parisi, Fair Use and Copyright Protection: A Price Theory
Explanation, 21 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 453 (2002) [hereinafter Depoorter & Parisi, Fair Use and
CopyrightProtection:A Price Theory Explanation].
30.
See Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyrights in Cyberspace - Rights Without Laws?, 73 CHI.-KENT. L. REV.
1155 (1998). The author argues that online technology allows copyright holders to create new exclusive
rights in information goods. According to Elkin-Koren, this process of eroding the public domain should be
subject to scrutiny because many of the presumptions in favor of private ordering, the assumptions of
economic efficiency and political legitimacy, are misguided. For a similar skepticism toward unrestricted
private control of Internet content, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE
COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001) (arguing increased private control endangers the innovation
commons of cyberspace); SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND How IT THREATENS CREATIVITY (2001) (arguing copyright stifles creativity
and policy concerns trump any property rights-based claims). But see James B. Speta, A Vision of Internet
Openness by Government Fiat,96 Nw. U. L. REV. 1553 (2001) (reviewing Lessig's THE FUTURE OF IDEAS:
THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD and arguing that benefits of coordination by
enhanced private control might lead to an overall increase of social wealth); Kenneth W. Dam, Self-Help in
the Digital Jungle, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 393 (1999) (self-help systems, even with regard to non-copyrighted
material, will empower technology and contract and, with the emergence of efficient standards, promote the
wide availability of content, while reducing transaction and search costs); Michael A. Einhorn, Digital
Rights Management, Licensing and Privacy (2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/

papers.cfm?abstract id=332720 (with its flexibility and sophistication, allowing the licensing market to
evolve is preferable to comprehensive approaches to a dynamic framework such as the Internet).
31.
This issue will be treated in further detail in infra Part II.C.2.
32.
For an illustration of trends in patent law litigation at the end of the century, revealing the
increased scope of the patent system, see, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Recent Developments in Patent Law, 6
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 103 (1997). Member States of the European Union have rationalized their patent
application system in the Patent Co-Operation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 9 I.L.M. 978. Within the contracting
states the degree of protection and enforcement of European patents varies. Courts within each state look at
its national patent jurisprudence, decisions of the European Patent Office, and case law in other contracting

states. Germany is considered to allow for the broadest claims. See John N. Adams, Choice of Forum in
Patent Disputes, 17 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 497 (1995).
33.
On the statutory treatment of software patents in the United States, see DONALD S. CHISUM ET
AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 754-64, 864-93 (2002). For a critique of software patents and their
limited effect on innovation, see LESSIG, supra note 30.
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protection of business methods are apposite examples.3 5 At the same time, new forms of
patent rights are being developed, such as second-tier patent protection systems. 36
Exclusionary rights have expanded beyond enablement3 7 and literal infringements to
include equivalents.3 8 Statutory acts have bolstered opportunities for inventors to obtain
34.
See also infra Part III.E.1.
35.
State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1596 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (business methods are patentable subject matter under U.S.C.); Larry A. DiMatteo,
The New "Problem" of Business Method Patents: The Convergence of National Patent Laws and
International Internet Transactions, 28 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1 (2002) (describing the

convergence toward the recognition of business methods as patentable subject-matter in Japan, Europe and
the United States). See infra Part III.E.2.
36.
For an overview, see Mark D. Janis, Second Tier Patent Protection, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 151
(1999). In general, "second tier" patents (also referred to as "the utility model" or "petty patents") receive
more limited protection (for instance, shorter period of protection) than regular patents but are not
subjected to prior patentability examinations. In the context of the anticommons model, second tier patent
protection is likely to produce a large number of stake holders, with high information and transaction costs
involved in the verification of infringements. This is due to the high level of post-issuance uncertainty. Id.
at 204. On second tier patent protection see also, e.g., Ann Bartow, Separating Marketing Innovation from
Actual Invention: A Proposalfor a New, Improved, Lighter, and Better-Tasting Form of Patent Protection,

4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 1, 5 (2000) (proposing "a modified form of patent protection, which may
better accommodate patents that are filed for reasons other than obtaining monopoly protection of an
invention for commercial exploitation purposes, such as patents obtained for leveraging competitors and
patents used for keeping up appearances"). Mark Lemley suggests that the high amount of patents issued,
relative to the minimal inspection of substantive requirements, represents a degree of "rational ignorance"
on the part of the patent system. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U.

L. REV. 1495 (2001). In light of the thesis developed below, see infra Part III, the overall social welfare
effect of such patent system depends on the relative costs of pre-issuing inspection of non-active patents,
relative to the deadweight losses involved in the post-issuance licensing process. For a similar proposal
with regard to copyright law, see Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: CopyrightProtection
of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1873-93 (1990) (proposing to vary protection across

creative "high authorship" works and "sweat of the brow," or "low authorship," works).
37.
Merges and Nelson note that "current practice seems to permit a range of claims that may stretch
beyond the spirit of the enablement doctrine. If the patent examiner can point to something in the prior art
that indicates that some embodiments of the claimed invention will be impossible to make without more
information than the inventor has disclosed, then the application may be rejected. But if the examiner
cannot point to such an indication in the prior art, patent office policy dictates that even very broad claims
may be allowed. This means that claims to pioneer inventions often are allowed to cover ground that
examiners believe, but cannot prove, is well beyond the area actually explored and disclosed by the
inventor. The rule puts the burden of disproving enablement on the examiner." This in effect, stretches the
enablement doctrine to claims that may be beyond the original intention of the enablement doctrine: that of
limiting protection of those inventions that are specified such that one skilled in the relevant art is in a
position to use all the embodiments of the claimed invention. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On
the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 848-49 (1990).

38.
Under the doctrine of equivalents, two inventions are considered identical if they accomplish the
same result even though they may differ in other artificial ways (e.g. name, form and shape). As to its
origin, "the doctrine of equivalents developed because of the frequency of cases where, even though the
accused product or process does not literally infringe a claim, it may be considered essentially the same
device as was patented." Id. at 853. For an illustration of expansionary propensities of the doctrine of
equivalents, see Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 114 F.3d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (a

product infringes on a patent if it is "unsubstantially" different from what the patent describes). The
uncertainty of such a rule of "unsubstantial difference" increases the risk of infringement and will lead to
more licensing. See remarks by Robert P. Merges in Teresa Riordan, Substantial Questions Linger After a
Ruling that Could Give PatentHolders More Power, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1995, at D2.
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patent rights, even for government or state sponsored research.39 Innovation has been
further moved into the domain of the patents system with the creation of a specialized
patent court, 40 and the consideration of commercial success as one determinant of
41
patentability.
3. Trademark Law: Ownership in Words and Signs
Similarly, trademark law has evolved from a concept of tort law, protecting
against deceit, to a more rigorous type of protection that is best explained through the
analytical lens of property rights.42 The "propertization" of trademark law has developed
from the minimal protection afforded against fraudulent intent to a broader concern for
potential customers, and for the rights of control by users.43
With the adaptation of the dilution doctrine, trademark owners no longer need to
demonstrate consumer confusion 44 or actual injury to obtain compensation from

39.
See, e.g., Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3019 (1980), which grants universities the
right to obtain patent ownership on federally sponsored research (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200212 (2000)).
40.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has been associated with many of the
extensions of patent law. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual

Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2224-32 (2000) [hereinafter Merges, Solicitude]
(ascribing to the Federal Circuit the expansion of non-obviousness in the context of biotechnology, the
acceptance of business patents and the development of patent doctrine in software); Donald R. Dunner et
al., A Statistical Look at the Federal Circuit's Patent Decisions: 1982-1994, 5 FED. CIR. B.J. 151 (1995)

(noting more than average findings in favor of patent owners before the Federal Circuit); Mark A. Lemley,
An Empirical Study of Twenty-Year Patent Term, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 369 (1994) (noting higher findings of
patent validity by the Federal Circuit). See also John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How Federal Circuit
Judges Vote in Patent Validity Cases, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 745 (2000). In the same vein of thought, see
Kevin Rhodes, Comment, The Federal Circuit's Patent Nonobviousness Standards: Theoretical
Perspectives on Recent DoctrinalChanges, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 1051 (1991). The question remains whether

these expansions of patent law would have occurred without a specialized court. Specialized courts tend to
strengthen the reach of their subject-matter.
41.
For a review of the Federal Circuit's development of this doctrine, see Robert P. Merges,
Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 805
(1988) [hereinafter Merges, CommercialSuccess].

42. "Courts protect trademark owners against uses that would not have been infringements even a few
years ago and protect as trademarks things that would not have received such protection in the past. And
they are well on their way to divorcing trademarks entirely from the goods they are supposed to represent."
Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1688
(1999) [hereinafter Lemley, Death of Common Sense].

43.

On the remarkable history and evolution of trademark law, see Daniel D. Domenico, Note, Mark

Madness: How Brent Musburger and the Miracle Bra May Have Led to a More Equitable and Efficient
Understandingof the Reverse Confusion Doctrine in Trademark Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 597, 600 (2000). In

the United States, property rights discourse is most (in)famously applied in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders,
Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979); Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316
(9th Cir. 1998).
44.
The dilution doctrine was uniformly introduced in the United States by the federal dilution statute
in 1995. 15 U.S.C. 1125(c) (1994). Section 45 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127, grants protection to
"famous" marks against dilution, regardless of "(1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and
other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception."
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trademark infringers.45 The trademark dilution doctrine has been extended to noncompeting, but also to non-identical, marks. Trademark law now protects famous trade
dress and product configurations, and also provides a cause of action against consumers
who do not use marks properly.46 Similarly, the adaptation of the doctrine of reverse
confusion47 and the introduction of product design protection48 are important signposts of
the expansion of trademark law. Much of this expansion reflects a tendency to regard
trademarks as property or commodities,49 often leading to the recognition of a broad
"merchandising right" in marks.
B. The Backlash against Intellectual Property Rights
The expansion of the intellectual property regime has not escaped scrutiny.
Commentators are in agreement that the persistent expansion of intellectual property tips
the balance toward an all-inclusive enclosure of information goods. Critics of this trend
have raised the concern that the expansion of intellectual property rights implicates
society in ways that go beyond providing incentives for creation and invention.5 0
As one esteemed commentator notes: "balance in [intellectual property] seems
over for now. A feeding frenzy has taken its place - not just in the field of patents, but in

45.

These aspects of the federal dilution statute were recently narrowed by the Supreme Court. See

Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003). See also Declan McCullagh, Supreme Court
Curbs Trademarks' Reach, CNET NEws.CoM, Mar. 4, 2003, at http://news.com.com/2100-1028991052.htnl. According to the Court, recognition of a word or phrase as a trademark will not necessarily
"reduce the capacity of the famous mark to identify the goods of its owner." Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433. This
decision is likely to have a big impact on pending and future cases. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Retail
Giant Asks Court to ProtectIts Name, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2002, at A24.
46.
Lemley, Death of Common Sense, supra note 42, at 1699.
47.
Under the doctrine of reverse confusion, smaller senior users are protected from larger, junior
users. Traditional trademark law protects large, established trademarks from smaller, junior users. The
doctrine originates from Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365 (10th
Cir. 1977). For a comprehensive treatment of the doctrine of reverse confusion, see J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION (4th ed. 1999). For a rejection of broad property
rights analysis, see Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Propertyand the Restitutionary
Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149 (1992).
48.
This evolution in U.S. case law is traced in Margreth Barrett, Trade Dress Protectionfor Product
Configurationsand the Federal Right to Copy, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 471 (1998); Graeme B.
Dinwoodie, Reconceptualizing the Inherent Distinctiveness of Product Design Trade Dress, 75 N.C. L.
REV. 471 (1997). On design law in the European context, see UMA SUTHERSANEN, DESIGN LAW IN EUROPE

(2000).
49.
See, e.g., Kenneth L. Port, The Illegitimacy of Trademark Incontestability, 26 IND. L. REV. 519
(1993) (finding that the introduction of the doctrine of trademark incontestability amounts to an
unprecedented recognition of a property right in trademarks).
50.
Many prominent scholarly commentators have expressed concern with the expanding
development of intellectual property law. See, e.g., Lemley, Romantic Authorship, supra note 9, at 875: "I
agree both with Boyle's general point that authors get too much protection from modern intellectual
property law and with many of his specific concerns about the contours of that law" (reviewing JAMES
BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY
(1996)).
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IP generally ...."s A review of the literature reveals that an overwhelming majority of
commentators and scholars are disconcerted with the expansive trend of intellectual
property law. 52
Much of the criticism surrounding the expansion of intellectual property law has
been triggered by the recent legislative protection of previously unregulated material on
the Internet. There are three main strands of criticism on the expansion of intellectual
property law. First, it is generally held that the recent expansion violates the purpose of
advancing the progress of arts and sciences because the protection of producers far
outweighs what is necessary to achieve the protection of incentives of authors.5 3 Second,
there is the argument, most prominently advanced by Lawrence Lessig, 54 that the free
availability of resources, unrestricted by private control rights, is the main impetus behind
technological innovation and intellectual and artistic creativity. This "innovation
commons" was essential, for instance, to the development of cyberspace. The argument
proceeds that, especially in a high tech world, public property has a greater role to play in
encouraging innovation and improvement. According to this view, the open source
movement provides a striking historical example of the viability of a communitarian
perspective on innovation, where profit and monopoly rights are not the cause of
innovation.5 5 Third, there is a belief that the expansion of copyright law has transgressed
51.

Lawrence Lessig, The Problem With Patents, THE STANDARD, Apr. 23, 1999, available at

http://www.lessig.org/content/standard/0,1902,4296,00.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2003). In the context of
trademark law, see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So Should We Be
Paying Rent? Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Rights of Publicity, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 123

(1996) (referring to the "privatization" of words and symbols); Lemley, Death of Common Sense, supra
note 42 (arguing that many recent developments cannot be explained by reference to economic theory).
52.
See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 25, at 647 (arguing that "the tendency of Congress, the courts and,
recently, the Clinton Administration to favor a neoclassical economic rationale for copyright results in an
unauthorized transfer of information policy from the public realm to the private realm"). Twenty-one law
professors gathered forces to submit a brief in support of the challenge to the constitutionality of the CTEA.

Brief of Amicus Curiae Copyright Law Professors in Support of Petition for Certiorari, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvasheroft/cert/

copyprof-amicus.
53.
See, for example, the discussion, supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text, regarding the Supreme
Court decision in Eldred.
54.
Suggesting a public interest explanation, Lawrence Lessig states: "Washington is obsessed with

intellectual-property rights. It lives under the mistaken idea that stronger IP always means a stronger
economy. No doubt it means larger campaign contributions, but whether it means a better market is a
tougher question." Lessig, supra note 51.

55.

The paradigm example of the open source movement is GNU/Linux, the successful operating

system that is distributed free and is steadily improved and debugged by a network of programmers. Other
notable free software includes the Perl language, the Apache Web servers, and Sendmail. See Sonia K.
Katyal, Ending the Revolution, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1465, 1471 (2002) (reviewing Lessig's THE FUTURE OF
IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD and Vaidhyanathan's COPYRIGHTS AND
COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND How IT THREATENS CREATIVITY). "[I]f the

digital revolution has taught us anything so far, it is that profit - and copyright - is no longer essential for
creativity to flourish, or even to begin." Katyal, supra, at 1486. See also Ryan, supra note 25, at 648

(arguing that "government is required to begin from a public rights baseline because information is a public
trust resource subject to public trust principles"). But open-source developments do not exist within an
economic vacuum. Often pioneering codes end up as commercialized products, leaving their pioneering
creators as folk-hero billionaires (see Marc Andreessen and Eric Bina for their work on Mosaic, or the sale
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beyond protection against unauthorized copying to include the control of the content
itself. According to Vaidhyanathan, the evolution of copyright law has blurred the
distinction between the protection of ideas and expression. In this view, copyright no
longer protects the creative process; it merely protects producers while taxing
consumers.5 7 The expansion of copyright law protects the status quo of existing works, to
the detriment of the public interest. Stronger intellectual property rights increase the
power of holders of those rights versus prospective creators that rely upon existing work.
These follow-up creators and innovators will need to obtain authorization from
incumbent intellectual property owners.
These accounts suggest that the current trend of "propertization" of information
goods strains the natural balance between the public and private right in creativity,
which rests on "a calculus of net social benefits." 59 This balance between the public and
private domain preserves incentives, while at the same time maintaining a relatively free
flow of information to allow technological progress and unhindered discourse. 60
l 17

of Netscape by Treuhaft and co. to America Online). Even the most successful open source technologies
have a business side to them. Companies in the open-source economy make money mainly by tailoring
programs for customers, and with service and support. In this business model, software increasingly
becomes a service business compared with the traditional model of shipping manufactured software goods.
See Steve Lohr, Can "Open Source" Bridge the Software Gap?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2000 (quoting

Irving Wladawsky-Berger, an IBM executive and then-member of the President's Information Technology
Advisory Committee: "I am increasingly coming to the conclusion that the Internet and open-source
initiatives are the free marketplace way of dealing with the extremely complex software issues we are
facing."). For a comprehensive treatment of the socio-economic aspects of open source technology, see
Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and "The Nature of the Firm," 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002).
56.
See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 30. Also, if copyright rests in originality, this would require

dissection of the creative process of every individual, prior to awarding copyright protection. See Jessica
Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 1023 (1990).

57.
In negating the incentive effect of property rights, Vaidhyanathan draws a distinction between
"property talk" and "policy talk." The former benefits authors, while the latter is attentive to the welfare of
society as a whole. VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 30, at 12. For a concise overview of Vaidhyanathan's
principal viewpoints, see Paul Schmelzer, The Anarchist in the Library: Discussing Cultural Democracy
with Siva Vaidhyanathan, EYETEETH: A JOURNAL OF INCISIVE IDEAS, Apr. 21, 2003, at

http://eyeteeth.blogspot.coi/2003_04_20_eyeteeth-archive. html#92977561.
58.
For the purpose at hand, this text will refer to the subject matter of intellectual property law as
"information goods" or "intellectual goods." The value of these goods is primarily an intangible idea,
concept or expression.
59.
Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 14, at 56.
60.
On the mainstream economic rationale underlying intellectual property rights, see NIKOLAUS
THUMM, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: NATIONAL SYSTEMS AND HARMONIZATION IN EUROPE 31-43

(2000) (the public good character of intellectual goods necessitates monopoly rights to ensure innovation
and diffusion). On the balance between incentives and monopoly deadweight losses in patent law, see
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, ProprietaryRights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE

L.J. 177 (1987) [hereinafter Eisenberg, ProprietaryRights] (discussing the conflict between patent law and
pre-existing norms of diffusion in biomedical sciences). But see Scott F. Kieff, Intellectual PropertyRights
and the Norms of Science: A Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 691 (2001) (availability of

patent protection is crucial to biology research; the community norms have always accommodated patents
as a necessity). In copyright law the balance can best be described as a system that "provides meaningful
incentives to first authors, while allowing second authors room to build on their predecessors' endeavors, as
well as reasonable leeway for autonomous consumer enjoyment ...." Ginsburg, Bad Name, supra note 27, at
63.
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This article does not take such a strong position. The role of private property
rights in the realm of intellectual or information goods has certainly increased.
Increasingly, legislative and judicial decisions have explicitly allocated the various use
rights in intellectual goods. As the simplified description above indicates, the overall
impression is that this process has resulted in stronger protection of producers of content.
C. Explaining the Emergence of Intellectual Property Rights
While the term "intellectual property law" is a relatively recent paradigm for the
treatment of information goods,61 the dominance of a property rights conception of
intellectual property rights has developed especially over the past 15 years.62 Where does
the property law coloration of intellectual property originate? Three alternative
explanations are prevalent in the academic debate. In my view, these theories omit
essential aspects that underlie the increased activity in the realm of intellectual property
law. This section proposes that the property rights-focus of contemporary intellectual
property law results from a dialectic process between technological progress and the
value of intellectual property goods. The theory developed in the remainder of this
section holds that the scope of intellectual property law systems is largely determined by
changes in the value of information goods, and by the transaction costs involved in the
management and enforcement of the rights in these goods. This section first reviews a
number of theories that attempt to explain the increased role of intellectual property law.

61.
See Lemley, Romantic Authorship, supra note 9, at 895 n.123, tracing the etymological roots of
intellectual property: "The modern use of the term 'intellectual property' as a common descriptor of the
field probably traces to the foundation of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) by the
United Nations." See Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14, 1967,
art. 2(viii), 21 U.S.T. 1749, 1772, 828 U.N.T.S. 3, 11. Since that time, numerous groups such as the
American Patent Law Association and the ABA Section on Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Law have
changed their names (to the American Intellectual Property Law Association and the ABA Section on
Intellectual Property Law, respectively). There were certainly uses of the term in the literature well before
this time, especially on the Continent. See, e.g., Davoll v. Brown, 7 F. Cas. 197, 199 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845)
(No. 3662) (defining intellectual property as "the labors of the mind, productions and interests as much a
man's own, and as much the fruit of his honest industry, as what he cultivates, or the flocks he rears").
62.
Stephen L. Carter, Does It Matter Whether Intellectual Property Is Property?, 68 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 715 (1993); Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considerationsin the Intellectual PropertyProtection
of Software, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 332 n.44 (1995); Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still
Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 108 (1990); Hardy, supra note 28; Edmund W. Kitch, Patents:
Monopolies or Property Rights?, 8 REs. L. & ECON. 31 (1986); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and
Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 275-80 (1977) [hereinafter Kitch, Nature and
Functionl; Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency,
Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (1989) (discussing similarities between

copyright law and the common law of property); Boudewijn Bouckaert, What is Property?, 13 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 775 (1990).
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1. Current Explanations
a. The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Law
The most straightforward and generally supported explanation for the expansion
of intellectual property rights lies with interest group politics. Small, homogenous groups,
such as copyright owners, are at a comparative advantage in organizing their interests for
the capture of the political and legislative agenda, as opposed to the more heterogeneous,
disorganized group of end users of intellectual goods. In this view, factors of political
economy are responsible for the strong property rights protection awarded to authors,
creators, inventors, and brand owners.64

Yet political economy cannot in itself explain the entire development of
intellectual property law to date; nor can it account for the continued expansion of
63.
The pioneering work in public choice theory is JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE
CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962). The popular
sentiment is that the expansion of intellectual property rights is to be attributed to lobbying efforts: "Over
the past 50 years, as a result of heavy lobbying by content industries, copyright has grown to such ludicrous
proportions that it now often inhibits rather than promotes the circulation of ideas, leaving thousands of old
movies, records and books languishing behind a legal barrier. Starting from scratch today, no rational,
disinterested lawmaker would agree to copyrights that extend to 70 years after an author's death, now the
norm in the developed world." Copyrights:A RadicalRethink, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 23, 2003.
64. For a description of the economic and political make-up of the intellectual property law system,
see Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward
Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561 (2000):

One starts with an assumption that there are producers and consumers
and that consumers are better off when producers have high incentives
to produce. One then creates a regulatory system that increases the
incentives for commercial production but also increases the costs of
becoming any kind of producer, forcing producers to try to recoup
these high entry costs by selling to wide audiences. This results in a
relatively small number of producers able to fund full-time authoring
and pay licensing fees to use existing information, who attempt to
recover their investments by capturing wide audiences. Opposite these
producers is a wide, passive audience of consumers constrained to
select what they buy from a narrow, relatively homogenous menu of
choices intended to guess what a large number of them will select
under these conditions. These producers, in turn, make up the political
lobby for continuing the basic structure as it is. This political economy
is responsible for an extensive enclosure movement that has pushed our
intellectual property law toward ever-increasing centralization, and has
squelched concerns that this galloping propertization is attained at the
expense both of innovation and of robust democratic discourse that a
well-balanced intellectual property law could serve.
Id. at 569-70. See also Tom W. Bell, The Common Law in Cyberspace, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1746 (1999)
(reviewing PETER HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE: ABOLISH THE FCC AND LET COMMON
LAW RULE THE TELECOSM (1997)); Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987) [hereinafter Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History];

Litman, Copyright Legislation, supra note 17; Merges, New Institutional Economics, supra note 14;

Merges & Reynolds, supra note 9.
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intellectual property law. If anything, the political economy of copyright, in particular, is
more leveled in today's digital era. In the current climate, the technology industry has a
lobbying agenda that is diametrically opposed to the interest of copyright owners. The
business interests of the technology industry conflict with that of copyright holders. That
is because the appeal of technological devices increases when these products can be used
freely to store and transfer content.65 The popularity of file sharing, for instance, has
created new markets for the computer industry, enhancing the appeal of their products.
The easy sharing of audio files spurred the demand for computer systems, hard drives,
faster microprocessors, and new portable digital devices.66 Napster created a demand for
MP3 players and recordable CD drives, blank media CDRs, and so forth. Given the
considerable political power of the electronics industry, one would expect the political
balance to tilt toward lower levels of intellectual property law protection. 67
As will be discussed below, new technological advances have increased the stakes
for the public at large, providing them with a stronger interest to organize effectively. 68
Several groups with an interest in opposing broad intellectual property laws have modest
political clout. However, in the aggregate, library associations, 69 social freedom groups, 70

65.
Audio equipment is more attractive to consumers if the recording of phonograms to audio tape is
permissible. Similarly, video systems have a stronger appeal if they can be used not merely for playing
back movies but also for recording television broadcasts. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (permitting so-called "time shifting" as fair use).
66.
In Brief of Amicus Curiae Intel Corp. in Partial Support of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), the Intel Corporation carefully hints at this interest: "Consumers rely on the
digital technologies created by Intel and other companies to gain access to and use content in new and
compelling ways. At the same time, the continued viability and expansion of these technologies depend on
readily available content that is of potential use and relevance to the public." Id. at 9. This business interest
in unrestricted copyright is also reflected in the active advertisement efforts of manufacturers. See Brad
King,

Are

Ads

a

Gateway to Illegal CDs?, WIRED

NEWs,

Apr.

11,

2002, available at

http://www.wired.coniVews/mp3/0,1285,51719,00.html.
67.
"Although the content sector has contributed heavily to political candidates over the years and
maintained a strong lobbying presence in Washington for many years, it cannot expect to ride roughshod
over the political interests of the technology sector. Any significant incursions into the freedom to develop
new products will encounter forceful opposition from the technology sector, which, over the past decade,
has invested substantial resources in the legislative process and gained valuable experience in working the
halls of Congress. The economic significance of the technology sector to the United States economy vastly
exceeds the contributions of the content industries and technology companies have strong financial
motivation to maintain their freedom to innovate." Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law's Digital
Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 63, 167-68 (2003). The consumer electronics industry alone, with annual
revenues of nearly U.S. $100 billion, is several times larger than the music and film industries combined.
Id. at 168 n.368 (citing Brad King, Replay TV Won't Quit, Won't Quit, WIRED NEWs, June 4, 2002,

available at http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0, 1412,52944,00.html).
68.
The work of Lawrence Lessig in particular rests upon the notion that cyberspace is a
"fundamentally important changed circumstance" in the traditional copyright equation. Because cyberspace
makes the public domain so readily accessible, the stakes are raised to keep copyrighted material flowing
into the public domain. Lessig raised this argument most recently before the Supreme Court in Eldred v.
Ashcroft. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices HearArguments on Extension of Copyrights, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.

10, 2002, at C2.
69.
The American Library Association has been especially active in challenging regulation with
regard to the issues of anticircumvention, automated rights management, first sale and database protection.
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open software movements, consumer protection groups, artists' rights, civil liberties, the
digital freedom movement,7 1 and the academic community 72 may exert considerable
pressure on the political system with their participation in the agenda-setting process of
legislative and judicial institutions. Follow-up authors, inventors and satirists who rely on
prior copyrighted or patented material turn to the judicial system to challenge
See Association of College & Research Libraries, Washington Watch: ACRL Legislative Agenda, at

http://www.ala.org/ala/acrl/acrlissues/washingtonwatch/washingtonwatch.htn.
70.
For an example of such concentrated efforts, see Amy Harmon, Owners of ReplayTV Recorders
File Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2002, at C5: "A civil liberties group asked a federal judge in Los
Angeles yesterday to rule that owners of ReplayTV recorders are not violating copyright law when they use
the device to compile a library of television shows, send a show over the Internet to other Replay owners,
or automatically fast-forward through commercials. In filing the lawsuit on behalf of five Replay owners,
the Electronic Frontier Foundation argues that the interests of consumers are being overlooked in [a]
continuing lawsuit that pits the major TV networks and movie studios against Sonicblue, the maker of
Replay. The media companies said that Sonicblue was contributing to copyright infringement by allowing
consumers to engage in activities like assembling an entire season's episodes of a given show or skipping
through commercials."
71.
For example, the Digital Future Coalition, consisting of educational, scholarly, library, and
consumer groups, as well as consumer electronics, telecommunications, computer and ISP industry
organizations, seeks to provide balance in litigation and policy discussions about copyright's future. See
Digital Future Coalition, A

Description of the Digital Future Coalition, at http://www.dfc.org/

dfcl/LearningCenter/about.html. The Electronic Frontier Foundation, at http://www.eff.org, and the
Home Recording Rights Coalition, at http://www.hrc.org, are examples of organizations attempting to

ensure broad rights of use with regard to VCRs, DATs, MP3 players and other technology involving music
and video content. See also Digital Consumer Organization, at http://www.digitalconsumer.org and
Boycott-RIAA, at http://boycott-riaa.com. This movement is aptly described in James Boyle, A Politics of
Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 DuKE L.J. 87 (1997) (arguing that protest,
advocacy, litigation, grassroots organization, membership, foundation support and digital networking will
bring about social change).
72.
Under the pretense of "a professional interest in seeing that intellectual property law develops in
ways that best promote its purposes," Brief of Amici Curiae Intellectual Property Law Professors in
Support of Respondents at 1, Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418 (2003) (No. 01-1015), the
academic amicus brief has become a regular feature in court proceedings. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae
Copyright Law Professors in Support of Reversal, Napster, Inc. v. A & M Records, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004
(9th Cir. 2001) (No. 00-16401), available at http://www.law.wayne.edu/litman/napster/Amicus.pdf; Brief
of Amicus Curiae American Committee for Interoperable Systems in Support of Appellee, ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (No. 96-1139), available at http://www.complaw.com/
lawlibrary/brief.html; Brief of Amicus Curiae Copyright Law Professors in Support of Petition for
Certiorari, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/
openlaw/eldredvashcroft/cert/copyprof-amicus.pdf. Mark Lemley, for instance, has submitted seven briefs
in his relatively short (albeit prolific) career to date as a law professor. Some professors have been even
more aggressive in their challenge of the expansion of intellectual property. Professor Lawrence Lessig
recently disputed the constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act before the Supreme Court in
Eldred v. Ashcroft. His argument rested on the premise that the text of the clause in Article I, Section 8 of
the Constitution authorizing Congress "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts" by issuing
exclusive copyrights for "limited times." does not allow the repeated extensions of the duration of
copyright protection. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Hear Arguments on Extension of Copyrights, N.Y.

TIMES, Oct. 10, 2002, at C2; see also Lawrence Lessig, How I Lost the Big One, Mar. 2, 2004, at
http://www.eldred.cc/eablog/000112.htnl. In association with the Berkman Center, Lessig decided to
challenge the Sony Bono Copyright Term Extension Act and actively sought to find plaintiffs with
standing: "The next step was finding a plaintiff, someone suffering harm by the extended copyright period
and the abuse of the Constitution it represented." Levy, supra note 5.
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developments that afford broad protection to intellectual property holders. 7 Despite the
decision in Eldred, constitutional rights provide a final safeguard against legislation that
caters too strongly to the private interest of intellectual property rights holders. 74
b. The Persuasion of Law and Economics of Real Property
Several commentators have linked the broad expansion of intellectual property
law to the infusion of the rhetoric of property rights and the application of the economic
theory of real property to "the very different world of intellectual property."75 Allegedly,
this trend commenced with a shift in terminology. 76 When intellectual property rights are
coated in the language of private property rights, and infringement is described as "theft,"
creative and innovative work is conceived of in terms of property rights. Once the
validity of property rights is accepted, the application of common law property rules and
underlying rationales follows naturally.7 8 If private property rights enhance investments
in the context of common (real) property, the public domain of intellectual goods stands
to benefit from the establishment of private property rights. 79 Innovation is best promoted
through strong property rights, especially when low transaction costs allow for Coasian
73.
This raises the alternative that the expansion is not the entire story of the evolution of copyright.
The availability of institutions to challenge legislative capture ensures that counterclaims to expansion get a
chance.
74. Feist is one example where expansion was barred because of perceived constitutional limitations
on copyright claims. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363-64 (1991). For a
discussion of the constitutional aspect of the protection of industrious information products that lack
originality in Feist, see Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat"? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of
Information after Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338, 367-88 (1992). Other examples are

plentiful. On the continued, albeit altered, role of constitutional law in intellectual property after Eldred, see
Samuelson, supra note 3.
75.
Lemley, Romantic Authorship, supra note 9, at 895. For an example of the tendency to revert to
real property analogies when discussing intellectual property law issues, see the oral arguments in Eldred v.
Reno, 239 F.3d. 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (No. 99-5430), reprinted in Symposia, The Constitutionality of
Copyright Term Extension: How Long is Too Long?, supra note 1, at 709. One of the judges for the District

of Columbia Circuit drew the real property analogy because "it's less challenging to the judicial mind." Id.
at 713.
76.
Lemley, Romantic Authorship, supra note 9 at 895-96. On the strategic use of rhetoric in the
debate over copyright and technology, see Ginsburg, supra note 36. In the hands of copyright owners and
consumers, private copying becomes "piracy" and unauthorized copying becomes "sharing," respectively.
77.
Here, the expansion is conceived as a more general trend in the law of information that allocates a
larger role to property rights both within and outside intellectual property. Pamela Samuelson, Information
as Property:Do Ruckelshaus and CarpenterSignal a Changing Direction in IntellectualPropertyLaw?, 38
CATH. U. L. REV. 365, 397-98 (1989). See also Hughes, supra note 6.

78.
"The right to exclude others from using your ideas is no more a monopoly than is the right to
exclude others from using your barn." Easterbrook, supra note 62. On the personal property analogy
stretched onto intellectual property, see also MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF
COPYRIGHT 90 (1993) (noting early comparisons of the author's right in literary property to the rights of
first possessors in real property chattels). But see Lemley, Romantic Authorship, supra note 9, at 896 n.124:
"But property in the sense in which it is used by the Chicago School has only recently been brought to bear
with much force on intellectual property law."
79.
This fits within the Constitutional role allocated to Congress with regard to intellectual property
rights to grant authors and inventors exclusive rights over their works in order "to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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bargaining. The case for private property rights and contracts, and against regulation,
becomes more attractive if one assumes the smooth functioning of the market, a view
which is associated with the Chicago School of law and economics.so In Mark Lemley's
view, the overall effect of the neo-classical economic approach is "a challenge to the very
idea of the public domain as an intrinsic part of intellectual property law." 81
Is it realistic to maintain that the Chicago School of law and economics caused the
direction of legislators and courts towards the expansion of our intellectual property law
system? While it is arguable that the Chicago School economists have influenced the
analytical terms of the debate, the influence of this school of thought should not be
overstated. If legal scholarship exerts such profound influence, the current wave of
critical attention to the exponential expansion of our intellectual property laws should
turn the tide toward a weakening of intellectual property laws. 82 Given the criticism of
the majority of commentators, may we expect in the near future a contraction of the law
of intellectual property? Most studies attest that the influence of legal scholarship is
modest at best.8 3 In the social sciences, the nature of the adversarial academic debate
tends to generate an overall picture that is noisy, 84 a debate that generally involves an
intrinsic amount of indeterminacy.8 5 In fact, several distinguished scholars have held that
80.

See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283,

311-13 (1996) (linking the rise of property rights in intellectual goods to the neo-classical economic theory
applied by Chicago School scholars in law and economics); Ryan, supra note 25, at 657 ("Neoclassical
economic theory views a system of clearly defined property rights as a prerequisite for such market
efficiency because the economic model through which the allocative goals of copyright doctrine are
theoretically realized requires broad, fully exchangeable property rights"); Lemley, Romantic Authorship,
supra note 9, at 901-02. The view under criticism is perhaps most explicitly worded by Judge Easterbrook.
See Easterbrook,supra note 62.
81.
Lemley, Romantic Authorship, supra note 9, at 902 (arguing that, if premised on the absence of
transaction costs and the prevalence of efficient licensing, this "wholesale attack" on the public domain is
misled).
82.
Even Richard Posner is critical of the expansion of intellectual property law: "These rights keep
expanding without any solid information about why they're socially beneficial. At the same time that
regulations are diminishing, intellectual-property rights are blossoming - (two) opposite trends bucking
each other." McCullagh, supra note 5.
83.

See generally David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731 (1987)

(legal scholarship is involved in an internal discussion among peers); Harry T. Edwards, The Growing
Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992) (legal

scholarship is remote from reality). The influence of pragmatic and economic scholarship on adjudication
and legal policy is generally considered to lie with the development of United States antitrust law. In
general, economic scholarship's effect on legal decision-making is more contentious. See, e.g., E. Allan
Farnsworth, Law Is a Sometime Autonomous Discipline, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 95 (1997); Jeffrey L.
Harrison, Trends and Traces: A PreliminaryEvaluation of Economic Analysis in ContractLaw, 1988 ANN.

SURV. AM. L. 73. In the patent context, see Craig Allen Nard, Toward a Cautious Approach to Obeisance:
The Role of Scholarship in Federal Circuit Patent Law Jurisprudence, 39 Hous. L. REV. 667 (2002)

(pragmatic legal scholarship is largely absent from the patent opinions of the Federal Circuit).
84.
On the intrinsic indeterminacy in social sciences, see Jon Elster, A Plea for Mechanisms, in
SOCIAL MECHANISMS: AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO SOCIAL THEORY 45-73 (Peter Hedstrim & Richard

Swedberg eds., 1998).
85.
The academic debate is inherently adversarial. For every academic argument one can find a
comment in contention with it. This is reflected in the exchange of amicus briefs. In Moseley v. V Secret
Catalogue, respondents' amicus brief cited the work of Richard Posner in arguing that dilution differs
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this applies in particular to the economic analysis of intellectual property law.86 As will
be argued below, coating intellectual property issues in terms of property rights is a
superficial change.
c. The Dazzling Romance of Authorship
One school of thought has linked the expansion of intellectual property rights to
the substitution of the "author-as-genius" for the "author-as-craftsman" conception of the
19th century.8 7 The general argument posits that authorship today exhibits a flair of
romanticism which is related to the individual's ability and talent to create intellectual
goods from scratch. Because intellectual authorship is intrinsically exceptional - far
beyond "sweat of the brow" work that characterizes most other productive activities this romantic conception of authorship carries with it a normative command for stronger
protection of intellectual work. In other words, exceptional people deserve privileged
protection.
Do we really owe the expansion of our intellectual property system to a romantic
conception of authorship? I believe we do not. For the argument to be upheld, an
historical explanation needs to link an increased romantic conception over time to the
expanding reaction of intellectual property law. It is questionable whether such a
continued rise in the romantic conception of authorship over time has occurred. 89 To the
materially from orthodox confusion and does not require proof of actual harm. See Brief of Amicus Curiae
International Trademark Association in Support of Respondents at 12-14, Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue,

537 U.S. 418 (2003) (No. 01-1015), available at http://www.inta.org/downloads/brief-vsecret.pdf.
86.
On the inability of economic theory to provide decisive answers to social welfare issues with
regard to intellectual property law, see George L. Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers About
Intellectual Property: Comment on Cheung, 8 REs. L. & ECON. 19 (1986); Louis Kaplow, The PatentAntitrust Intersection:A Reappraisal,97 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1833 (1984) ("our knowledge is inadequate
to inspire great confidence even in the desirability of having a patent system at all ..."; cited in Nard, supra

note 83, at 689 n.72).
87.
For an historical exploration, see Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic
and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the "Author," 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425 (1984).
88.
BOYLE, supra note 50. For more on the concept of romantic ownership, see, e.g., Keith Aoki,
(Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Ownership, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 1293 (1996); Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors, and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual Property
and the Public Domain, 18 CoLuM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1 (Part I) & 191 (Part II) (1993-94); James D.A.
Boyle, The Search for an Author: Shakespeare and the Framers, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 625 (1988); Jaszi,
supra note 20; Pamela Samuelson, The Quest for Enabling Metaphors for Law and Lawyering in the
Information Age, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2029 (1996) (book review); ROSE, supra note 78, at 125-28; Wendy J.
Gordon, A PropertyRight in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the NaturalLaw of Intellectual
Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993); Wendy J. Gordon & Sam Postbrief, On Commodifying Intangibles,
10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 135 (1998) (book review); Symposium, Intellectual Property and the Construction
of Authorship, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 227-725 (1992); JANE M. GAINES, CONTESTED CULTURE:
THE IMAGE, THE VOICE AND THE LAw (1991); Boyle, supra note 71; Mark Rose, The Author as Proprietor:
Donaldson v. Becket and the Genealogy of Modern Authorship, 23 REPRESENTATIONS 51 (1988); Martha
Woodmansee, supra note 87. But see Litman, supra note 56 (tackling the problematic nature of
"authorship" and the subsequent private property rights approach to copyright law).
89.
There is no direct evidence of a continued rise of the romantic conception of authorship over time,
nor does the literature explain why the appeal of a romantic conception would rise over time. Instead, in the
era of post-war industrialization and the emergence of the new information economy, little romantic
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contrary, the economic reality of today's intellectual property laws, perhaps best
exemplified by the rise of corporate copyright ownership and the transfer of employee
inventions to employers, 90 conflicts with "author- or inventor-centrism" 91 and romantic
notions of authorship. 92 In another view, the conception of authorship is in itself
troublesome. If we concede to the deconstructionist viewpoint, authorship is suspect
since texts are unstable and originality is inherently problematic. 93
As will be argued below, the expansion of intellectual property may be explained
in a more straightforward manner. Intellectual property systems simply trace underlying
technological and economic conditions. The expansion of the intellectual property law
system has two main causal determinants: (1) the value of information goods; and (2)
transaction costs in the management and enforcement of the rights in these goods.
2. The Origins of Property Rights in Information Goods
As this section demonstrates, the rise of private property rights in the
development of intellectual property law is hardly surprising. Private property rights are
not the result of simple legislative capture by content providers, the stickiness of a
romantic conception of authorship, or persuasive scholarship by imperialist economists.
Nor is the rise of intellectual property rights due to any endemic change in the law by
itself.94 Private property rights in intellectual property goods are a simple result of
changes in economic values that stem from the development of new technology and the
opening of new markets. This is not a novel claim. It aligns with the seminal explanation
of the emergence of property rights by Harold Demsetz. In Demsetz's words, "[p]roperty
rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains of internalization become larger
that the cost of internalization." 95
The connecting factor between Demsetz's example of establishing property rights
discourse is to be observed. In the new information economy it is the CEO/entrepreneur who is heralded as
truly exceptional.
90.
Robert P. Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1
(1999) [hereinafter Merges, Employee Inventions].
91.
Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades
and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 151 (1998).
92.
Lemley, Romantic Authorship, supra note 9.

93.
In such a view, the substitution by corporate ownership might have rightly demystified the fallacy
of authorship. Still, its relinquishment to corporate forces has the result of exposing future creative
endeavors to the stifling effect of market forces and monopoly. See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 30, at 10.
94.

Cf Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of

Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 77, 94 (1999) (holding that "not market influence but legal change specifically, changes in intellectual property law" is responsible for the introduction of exclusivity in
scientific research). This view is systemic for a belief that granting a property right in an intellectual good
makes the pursuit of these intellectual goods more attractive. Two points must be made here. First, the
value of such artificial protection is limited by the value of what is granted exclusively via intellectual
property law. Second, legal change does not fall from the sky. It is driven by underlying social forces. If we
are to assume a static economic and norm-based environment, we will need an alternative explanation to
explain legal change.
95.
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in land and the case of intellectual property law is externalities. Private rights in land and
forest animals among the Montagnes Indians of the Labrador Peninsula developed in
response to heightened opportunities in commercial fur trade, in the same way as
property rights in information goods emerge in the face of new digital markets for
content. Because overhunting presents a relatively serious problem when fur is valuable,
there is a strong incentive to internalize costs via property rights protection, especially if
the costs of defining the boundaries of those rights are lowered.96 Similarly, if
downloading content material on file-sharing systems, such as Napster, dissipates
incentives for content providers, this leads to sub-optimal investments 97 and a reluctance
of content providers to sell their products on digital markets. 98
Technological change commentators often fail to consider that, no matter how
revolutionary technological advancements may be, the laws of supply and demand and
the theoretical framework of external effects apply to technological change in the same
manner they do to any other shift in relative costs caused by exogenous changes. That is,
even in cyberspace the emergence of new property rights takes place "in response to the
desires of interacting people for adjustment to new benefit-cost possibilities." 99 In the
context of cyberspace, intellectual property law allows content providers to internalize
the commercial synergy between authored works and new technological means of
distribution and presentation of information.
It is not my intention to provide a normative claim as to the appropriateness of the
specific allocation of property rights, as it has occurred in the evolution of intellectual
property laws. The basic point made here is that the basic conditions for the origination of
private property rights in land among American Indians apply to the market for
intellectual property rights. The development of fur trade and the development of a digital
market for content hold two aspects in common: (1) a shift in the underlying economic
value of the assets in the domain of intellectual property (strong property rights having an
enabling effect in salvaging this opportunity), and (2) the decreased costs of defining the
boundaries of those goods.
a. Increase in the Value of Intellectual Property
Because "our society is predominantly and increasingly a service society" 100 and

96.
Demsetz attributes the relative absence of private property rights on the Southwestern plains to
the high costs of containing wide range, migratory animals. For Indians of the Labrador Peninsula, fencing
forest animals was relatively less expensive. Variance in the degree of private property rights protection
can be explained in relation to the costs involved in the "fencing" of those assets. See also Robert C.
Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1315-44 (1993); Barry C. Field, The Evolution of
Property Rights, 42 KYKLos 319 (1989); Dean Lueck, The Extermination and Conservation of the
American Bison, 31 J. LEGAL. STUD. 609 (2002).

97.
Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 14, at 55. This might explain the emergence of various sui
generis protections.
98.
Einhorn, supra note 30, at 7-8.
99.
Demsetz, supra note 95, at 350.
100. Dam, supra note 30, at 395.
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because "the service portion ... is increasingly based on information,"101 the value of
intellectual goods is now higher than ever. As the economic focus has shifted from
tangible to intangible products and services, increasing the frequency of transactions in
services and information, intellectual property is now an essential component of today's
economy. 102 The commercial exchange of intangibles is an increasing percentage of the
economylos and accounts for a sizeable amount of the GDP of industrialized nations.104

Intellectual property goods have become a "crucial set of corporate assets in the new
information economy."105 This trend is present in the markets for copyright, patent and
trademark.
(1) Copyright Law and the (Several) Miracle(s) of
Reproduction
The music industry underwent sweeping changes in the 1940s with the
introduction of electronic recording techniques, the development of phonogram records
and the breakthrough of the magnetic tape recorder. These technological advances
forever altered the nature of the market for music.106 For those involved in the production
of music, these advancements increased the stakes considerably. Phonogram records,
improved recording techniques, magnetic tapes and tape recorders, and nationwide
markets created a lucrative industry. 107
With the most recent advancements in digital technology, the means of producing,

101. Id.
102. Today's economy is characterized by an increasing role of traditional services in information
goods, and "new economy" components, especially where technology fosters novel commercial
applications of information transmission.
103. A less frequently discussed trend is that "historically recognized but nonetheless atypical forms of
property, such as intellectual property, are becoming increasingly important relative to the old paradigms of
property such as farms, factories, and furnishings." Hughes, supra note 6, at 288.
104. In 2001, copyright industries (including movies, television programs, home videos, business and
entertainment software, books, music and sound recordings) contributed an estimated $535.1 billion to the
U.S. economy, accounting for approximately 5.24% of GDP. See STEPHEN E. SIWEK, INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE, COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: THE 2002 REPORT 3

(2002), available at http://www.iipa.com/pdf/2002_SIWEKFULL.pdf. On the role of copyright in the
American economy, see Ginsburg, Bad Name, supra note 27, at 61 n.1 (citing sources). A similar trend
emerges on a global scale. See Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, The
Knowledge-Based Economy: A Set of Facts and Figures (1999), available at http://wwwl.oecd.org/subject/

cstp/1999/pdf/kbeco_01.pdf.
105. Merges, Solicitude, supra note 40, at 2235.
106. Id. at 2196.
107. These technological advancements also enhanced the illegal reproduction and piracy of
phonograms. Merges refers to the legislative history of the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, showing
that U.S. $300 million in revenue at that time paralleled U.S. $100 million in pirated revenue. Merges,
Solicitude, supra note 40, at 2197. H.R. REP. No. 92-87 (1971) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier), reprinted
in MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, app. 18, at 18-3 (1963). Record companies urged for the

creation of state law misappropriation doctrines and special state legislation. Mergers, Solicitude, supra
note 40, at 2197 and sources cited therein.
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reproducing, and storing text, music, and movies are significantly enhanced.108 Combined
with perfect, costless reproduction capabilities, improved compression software, and
increased bandwidth, copyright owners have seen the beginnings of a new electronic or
"e-market" for the distribution and commercialization of content. 109
Digital technology has also increased the value of information. Digital
technologies "break through the functional rigidities of print media by providing users
with extraction tools that enable them to sort and arrange data in ways meaningful to
them."110 Modern technology can turn incoherent data into meaningful and valuable
information.
(2) Patent Law: The Marketing Value of a Patent
Portfolio
Structural changes in the innovation industry have increased the monetary value
of patents. Large scale markets and rising living standards have increased the stakes in
innovation, especially in therapeutic products. As research becomes increasingly capital
intensive, this brings about the "industrialization of science," 1 reflected in the
"corporatization" of industrial research and development, 112 where inventions become
strategic tools in a market in which several multinationals are engaged in a competitive
race of innovation.
1137 It has become increasingly harder to draw a strict line between fundamental and
applied research, because both categories have become of commercial importance due to
the increased dynamics between both types of research.' Take, for instance, the world

108. Over the past decade, information technology has achieved exponential improvements in, e.g.,
convergence between various technical devices, means of searching data, flawless, inexpensive and rapid
reproduction, processor speeds and memory storage on personal computers.
109. For a review of the evolution of analog to digital technology, see Menell, supra note 67, at 10329. Once purchased, digital data can be perfectly duplicated at minimum cost. This effect of the intangible
nature of digital data is compounded by the availability of peer-to-peer sharing networks. Peer-to-peer
technology allows sharing of computer resources and services by direct exchange between computer
systems. Peer-to-peer technology eliminates the need for centralized servers for storage of the resources.
Instead, the common pool of shared resources is accessible on each individual user's computer. This
evolution creates a strong interest for both content producers and end users. This is discussed further below.
110. Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 14, at 65 & n.60.
111. On the origin of this trend that emerged after the Second World War, see JEROME R. RAVETZ,
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND ITS SOCIAL PROBLEMS (1996).
112. Prior to recognizing corporate ownership of patents, a number of judicial and legislative changes
acknowledged the essential role of corporations in the development of patents by their employees. This is
reflected in (1) the enforcement of contracts between employers and employees who grant ownership to the
latter, and (2) changes to the rules for naming inventors and the holding of patent portfolios. See Merges,
Solicitude, supra note 40, at 2215-25 (describing this trend).
113. This is reflected in the increasingly overlapping activities by academic and industrial researchers:
"Academic and industrial researchers are often working on the same or closely related problems, whether
competitively or collaboratively. Noteworthy scientific discoveries are made in industrial laboratories, and
patentable inventions are made in university laboratories." Eisenberg, ProprietaryRights, supra note 60, at
196 (footnotes omitted).
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of DNA sequencing. 114 Previously, commercial value lay in the use of DNA molecules
for the production of therapeutic proteins for sale. 11 In today's research climate
information itself has enormous commercial potential, because it provides a direct base
for future discovery.116 Instead of cloning particular genes, the research and development
objective has shifted to the more ambitious task of sequencing entire genomes.1 17 Due to
technological advances, information itself retains important commercial value." Thus
the subject matter of patent law has changed to enable speedy integration into marketable
output. 119
Moreover, intellectual property rights have become valuable assets on capital
markets, even before a finished and marketable product exists. Patent portfolios are
important tools in attracting investment and venture capital - working as a signal of the
114.

The seminal work in this area is by Rebecca Eisenberg:
There are two reasons why informational value looms large relative to
tangible value in this context, in contrast to the targeted cloning
projects of an earlier era that yielded sequences encoding products of
known value. First, high-throughput DNA sequencing typically yields
information about DNA sequences for which the corresponding
biological functions are not yet understood. It is thus unclear at the time
of sequencing whether a particular sequence will have tangible value.
Second, high-throughput DNA sequencing typically yields considerable
chaff (in the form of non-coding sequences and sequences that do not
correspond to any apparent commercial products) along with the
occasional bit of wheat (in the form of sequences encoding
commercially valuable proteins or offering other uses in tangible form).
What is most valuable about these research results, at least initially, is
that they provide an information base for future discovery. DNA
molecules corresponding to some portions of the sequence, such as
those portions that encode valuable proteins or that are the site of
diagnostic markers, may ultimately prove valuable as tangible
compositions of matter. But it might not be immediately apparent just
where in the sequence these nuggets of tangible value lie.

Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Re-Examining the Role of Patents in Appropriating the Value of DNA Sequences, 49
EMORY L.J. 783, 788-89 (2000) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Role of Patents]. See also Clarisa Long, Patent

Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625 (2002) (discussing how patents can reduce information asymmetries
between patentees and observers).
115.

Eisenberg, Role of Patents,supra note 114, at 788.

116. See infra Part III.E. 1.
117. A patent holder's right to exclude others from using a specific set of intangible genetic
information patents traditionally covers genetic information in a physical form, such as molecules of DNA
(deoxyribonucleic acid), RNA (ribonucleic acid) or proteins. See James Bradshaw, Gene Patent Policy:
Does Issuing Gene PatentsAccord with the Purposes of the U.S. Patent System?, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV.

637, 639 (2001).
118. The commercial value of abstract genetic information has changed over time. "In the early days
of patenting genes, the commercial value of genetic information derived not from the control of the
information itself, but from control over its embodiment in the form of a tangible composition of matter i.e. proteins." Id. at 641 (noting that new genetic information discovery is routine, as is the issuance of gene
patents).
119. This applies especially to research in recombinant DNA and related technologies that allow the
creation of new organisms with the capacity to produce new products. See Eisenberg, ProprietaryRights,
supra note 60, at 195.
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credibility of a business venture.120 As such, patents have come to serve purposes that are
unrelated to anticipated commercial successes, and serve to exclude competitors from a
market. Patents have become powerful marketing tools, used to enhance the value of the
patenting entity, as a signal of the latter's creativity and technological proficiency. 121
(3) The Three Risings of Trademark Law
The historical development of standardized manufacturing and processing
technologies, centralized distribution techniques, and transportation networks 122 have
allowed companies to economize on scale effects by targeting a global consumer
economy. In these structural conditions information plays an increasingly important role.
Brand recognition is crucial in information-flooded markets that offer a plethora of
different products and services. Recognizable names, signs, and symbols are crucial
instruments in such a competitive environment. 123
In the service and information economy, advertising and brand loyalty have
gained importance. By contrast, in the old, post-industrial economy, transactions mainly
concerned discrete, readily identifiable product units. In dynamic, ephemeral service
markets, where the role of experience characteristics is important, non-price determinants
of commodities play a crucial role. This increases the importance of advertising and
product differentiation. 124
The introduction of electronic commerce presents a third step in the rise of
trademarks as crucial business assets. Mix today's mass consumer culture with the
worldwide, twenty-four hour accessibility of online products and services, and a new
market forum with immense commercial potential is revealed. The importance of brands
and recognizable signs is amplified for the purposes of e-commerce, because cyberspace
confronts consumers with limitless amounts of information. This is due largely to
economic factors. The low costs of producing and communicating information via the
Internet create a situation where "the old points of concentration - the presses and
distribution systems, the broadcast transmitters and licenses, the cable systems - no
longer present the same insurmountable barriers to entry to becoming a speaker as they
do in the mass mediated environment."125 This results in the drastic reduction of entry
120. Id. at 196. See also John M. Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability:
Natural Products and Invention in the American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101 (2001) (suggesting patents

provide "intermediate products" to small research firms which are crucial in attracting investments for the
further development of commercial products).
121. Bartow, supra note 36, at 3. See also Long, supra note 114.
122. Merges, Solicitude, supra note 40, at 2206-07. The leading example is the Coca-Cola Company;
the value of the Coca-Cola brand is estimated at U.S. $160 billion. Alex Brummer, Coca-Cola Learns
What's Untouchable, THE GUARDIAN, June 19, 1999. Approximately 89% of the value of the company can
be

traced

to

brand

name

value.

See

Aswath

Damodaran,

Value

of a

Brand Name,

at

http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/-adamodar/pdfiles/brand.pdf.
123. On the legislative history following this structural shift, see Merges, Solicitude, supra note 40, at
2208-10.
124.

Lemley, Death of Common Sense, supra note 42, at 1693.

125.

Benkler, supra note 64, at 568.
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barriers for suppliers of products and services. Once again, changes in economic
conditions have increased the stakes for the internalization of positive externalities.
b. Diminishing Transaction Costs
With each technological progression, the transaction costs of communicating and
transferring content declines. This cost reduction has occurred with the development of
mass media systems, transport systems, the service economy, satellite systems, and the
growth of modern telecommunication.
More recently, the costs of contracting have further declined because of advances
in information technology. Automated rights management systems, for instance, allow
for the mechanical administration of intellectual property licenses. The online availability
of intellectual property rights database systems reduces search costs.
144 By controlling and monitoring each individual use, product differentiation can be

administered even for purposes that were previously left idle because transaction costs
were prohibitively high. As such, technology has improved the capability of intellectual
property rights holders to engage in self-help measures of enforcement of the statutory
monopoly rights conferred to them by Congress. Digital encryption technology fences
intellectual goods from non-authorized uses. Software of this kind establishes effective
rights of exclusion in digital content - be it text, pictures, music, or movies - because
access to the encrypted content requires an individualized, non-duplicable digital key. In
some instances the developments in digital technology have tilted the protection of
intellectual property rights toward more individualized, stronger enforcement. 126
Automated rights management systems allow content providers to restrict access to a feeper-use basis127 and to monitor with accuracy the use of the content. 128 This technology
126. Typically, content industries have declined to sue individual end users. Yet, there seems to be a
re-adjustment of this strategy. See Anna Wile Mathews & Bruce Orwall, Music Labels Go After SongSwappers: Recording Companies Plan Lawsuits Against Individuals, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2002. See in this

regard the conviction of a college student, under the No Electronic Theft ("NET") Act, who had posted
computer software programs, musical recordings, entertainment software programs, and digitally recorded
movies on his Internet Web site. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, First Criminal Copyright
Conviction Under the "No Electronic Theft"(NET) Act for Unlawful Distribution of Software on the
Internet (Aug. 20, 1999), at http://www.cybercrine.gov/netconv.htm. Similar prosecutions have occurred
elsewhere. See, e.g., in Belgium the decision in Kort Geding Rechtbank van Eerste Aanleg (Trial Court),
Antwerp, 21 Dec. 1999, AR K. nr. 99/594/C (student convicted for posting hyperlinks to mp3 files on a
personal Web site). These types of suits and prosecutions are now possible because in the digital
environment footprints are left behind, which reduces monitoring costs. Furthermore, as privacy suits are
finding their way through courts, Internet service providers have been compelled to turn over the names of
customers suspected of illegally sharing music online. See Jonathan Krim, File Sharing Forfeits Right to
Privacy: Judge Tells Verizon to Identify Customers, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 2003, at El.

127. Automated rights management systems are technologies that enable copyright owners to regulate
reliably and charge automatically for access to digital works. For a further description of automated rights
management systems, see Bell, supra note 28.
128. "In the predigital environment copyright gave owners some rights to profit from their work, but
law and reality made it impossible to track or physically prevent all uses of 'owned' cultural products in
school papers or personal conversations. Spielberg could charge for all sorts of ways of viewing Schindler
but could not prevent My Grandmother from being made. This is what made it possible for commercial
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enables "information providers to enforce standard copyright claims mechanically,
without resort to the threat of litigation." 129 There has been much criticism of the use of
technology for the enforcement of copyrights. Some have argued that this technology
allows intellectual property owners to control their work in ways that are beyond the
privileges afforded by intellectual property law.130 Regardless of this claim, the advent of
such effective means of enforcement forces us to see intellectual property rights
protection in more literal terms. Digital technology brings the law in practice closer to the
law in the books.
Perhaps some of the criticism of the use of self-help digital
vendors of cultural products to coexist with a vibrant public conversation. Now, movies released in
encrypted digital format can be made impervious to this kind of creative recreation, and the recording
industry can peek into college dorms to see if kids are mixing their own tapes." Benkler, supra note 64, at
571.
129. Bell, supra note 28, at 560. Of course, no enforcement mechanism is truly perfect. The
circumvention of DVD Content Scrambling Systems, Real Networks' streaming protection measures,
Adobe's eBook reader, and the security code of the Xbox game console confirm that whenever
technological protection of intellectual property is created, some specialist will always be able to
compromise this technology. The most embarrassing illustration is the faltering of the Secure Digital Music
Initiative ("SDMI"). The recording industry was hopeful that it would secure protection for its future
releases with new watermarks technology that placed code onto a file that was supposedly impossible to
remove without damaging the quality of the sound or image. When the SDMI opened a hacking contest,
challenging the public to break the digital watermarks, Edward Felten, an associate professor at Princeton,
and a team of computer experts cracked several of these watermarks. When Felten wanted to present his
findings at a conference, the SDMI and the Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA")
threatened to sue for copyright law violation. Felten's free speech lawsuit was dismissed in federal court.
See John Schwartz, 2 Copyright Cases Decided in Favorof EntertainmentIndustry, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 29,

2001, at C4. There is a wisdom in computer science which holds that the same technology that allows the
creation of digital protection can be used to break ("crack") that technology. This has traditionally resulted
in an "arms race" between content providers and the underground "hacker" movement. More complex
technological protection requires more complex measures to override this protection. This applies
especially when technological protection is built into the hardware frame of the technology, in addition to
the software components. See, for instance, the protection built into DVD and Playstation 2 playback
devices. As the user-friendliness of the circumvention tools reduces - in order to play illegal copies of
games a chip needs to be installed into a Playstation 2 - copy protection becomes more effective. This issue
is discussed in Ben Depoorter, The Fight over the Direction of Copyright Law in the Digital Era: Cycles
and Echelons in Copy Protection, CASLE WORKING PAPER #11 (2003).

130. See, e.g., Karjala, supra note 28, at 513 (arguing that standardized, uniformly enforceable
contracts will regulate and diminish copyright user rights); Netanel, supra note 80 (arguing that technology
raises high fences that amount to unprecedented copyright control); David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private
Contract and Public Policy: Federal Preemption of Software License Prohibitions Against Reverse

Engineering, 53 U. PITT. L. REv. 543, 608 (1992) (software license terms amount to "extra-statutory supercopyright"); Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED MAG., Jan. 1996, available at
http://www.wired.cornwired/archive/4.01/white.paper.html (technology gives rights holders much stronger
protection than the rights held under the traditional copyright regime.). But see Bell, supra note 28, at 61418 (those who rely on methods subject to preemption have the opportunity to exit from copyright into
common law).
131. According to some, the literal application of copyright and trademark law will bring these areas of
law in line with the broad restrictions of use under patent law. See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, An
Economic Analysis of Seller and User Liability in Intellectual Property Law, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 37-45

(1999). The authors cite the National Information Infrastructure Task Force ("NIl") proposal as examples
of such an extension: "The NII claims, for example, that when a person accesses a website she makes a
copy (as defined in the Copyright Act) of the site's content, because the text is, in fact, fixed upon the
random access memory (RAM) of her computer for 'a period of more than transitory duration.' The viewer
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technology by producers of intellectual property is due to the fact that such enforcement
creates a distribution of use of intellectual property that is quite different than the more
lenient systems of imperfect enforcement to which we have grown accustomed.132
Although injunction is the standard remedy, intellectual property law often relies on
liability rules when the enforcement costs of property rule protection are prohibitive. For
instance, it is prohibitively expensive to monitor all individual uses of photocopiers,
blank tapes, CDs, scanners, and other devices that can be used to reproduce illegitimate
copies of copyrighted work. Instead, the use of these devices is subject to a copyright
tax.
For the same reason, copyright collectives grant blanket licenses instead of
negotiating on each individual use of copyrighted work.134 By contrast, recent
advancements in automated rights management technology, encryption software, and
"tethered" technology 1s provide copyright owners with the tools to regulate access and
to enjoin unauthorized individual use of content. Of course, such a move from liability to
property rule protection is not absolute. In the absence of these measures of protection,
and in the hands of "hackers," the very technology that enables strong enforcement
reduces the costs of the illegitimate transfer of content. Yet, the costs of legitimate
fencing are lowered by new technology and are distinct from the costs of preventing
illegal activities. I return to this issue in the following section.
c. Discussion
In summary, the increased protection of copyrights, patents, and trademarks can
be understood as the combined result of the increased value of these products and a
decrease in transaction costs surrounding their marketability and the effective protection
of these rights by their producers. Property rights offer an opportunity to content
providers to capture the value of their creations, securing investments in an information
therefore infringes unless the owner of any copyrighted material posted on the site has authorized her
access. The logic of this position also suggests that when the recipient of an e-mail message forwards that
message to another, she induces the other to make an unauthorized copy (and may be violating the owner's
distribution rights as well)." Id. at 38. The important point is that, as a medium, on cyberspace digital
technology enables the enforcement of such literal interpretations.
132. Compare the enforcement of copyright law against individual offenders, as opposed to the
traditional regime in which commercial piracy was the focus. See Mathews & Orwall, supra note 126.
These types of suits are now manageable because in the digital environment footprints are left behind.
133. Copyright "taxes" have virtually become a universal feature of copyright enforcement. For an
example in the European context, see Law of June 30, 1994, Belgian Act on Copyright Law and Related
Rights, arts. 55-58 (B.S., July 27, 1994). Authors, performing artists and producers of audio and visual
materials receive equal portions of a 3% tax on the sale price on recording equipment, and 2 and 5 Belgian
francs per every hour of analog and digital recording carriers. Cf the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992
("AHRA"), which establishes a royalty on the sale of devices and blank recording media. 17 U.S.C. §§
1001-1010. Manufacturers and importers of digital audio recording equipment and blank tapes, disks and
other storage devices contribute 2% of the transfer price on digital audio devices and 3% on storage media
to a copyright pool. Id at § 1004. The pool is distributed to owners of musical compositions (one-third)
and sound recordings (two-thirds) based on prior year sales and air time. Id. at § 1006.
134. See Merges, Contractinginto Liability Rules, supra note 28.
135. "Tethered" technology allows copyright holders to time the exact number of playbacks of a
digital audio or audiovisual good by a consumer and to bar further access after the contractually-provided
amount of uses. Such measures can be understood as self-help rights of injunction.
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or knowledge economy.
Some clarification is in order. Property rights activity develops because of private
incentives of content providers. Precisely for this reason it does not follow that the
emergence of private property rights implies that the accommodation of technology and
intellectual property law through property rights protection will bring about the most
efficient allocation from a societal perspective. Here my analysis departs from the
assumption that emergence of property rights equals wealth maximization or that the
developing intellectual property rights necessarily follow societies' "cost-benefit
equation," as the optimistic claim in the Demsetzian reading of property rights' evolution
would have it.136 Rather, it is suggested that private property rights allocations will
emerge in light of the interaction of the changed conditions and the preference of those
parties that have a strong incentive to internalize the changing costs and benefits. Private
property rights are an obvious first-best for those involved in the first stage of legal
change. To content providers, private property rights establish maximum control rights
over intellectual resources. Consequently, private property rights are a main focal point
in the struggle over the boundaries of free access to intellectual material.
Part IV will examine the societal implications of the emerging "propertized"
market of intellectual property rights. In the meantime, I take a step back and consider the
larger social economic process of the emergence of property rights. The original
Demsetzian theory on the emergence of property rights leaves open the precise
mechanism by which a property rights system eventually takes shape.13 8 The remainder
of this section is a first attempt to fill this void in the context of intellectual property
rights.

136. See Thomas W. Merill, The Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL
STUD. 331, 332 (2002). See also Stuart Banner, Transitions Between Property Regimes, 31 J. LEGAL STUD.

359 (2002) (relating property rights changes to political economy factors such as political hierarchy and
power, providing a case study of the British settlers against the Maori people in New Zealand). "The
Demsetz story is a happy one, because it implies that over the long run, property rights will be reallocated
in the direction of efficiency." Id. at 360. See also Saul Levmore, Two Stories About the Evolution of
PropertyRights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 421, 429 (2002) (discussing the roles of optimistic, transaction costsbased versus pessimistic interest group-based explanations of property regime changes: "The Demsetz-style
story about transaction costs, as well as the related depictions of technological advances and price changes
leading to closed access and private investment, is at root quite optimistic.").
137. Property rights, with hard rights of exclusion, provide content providers with more control and
discretion in the management of resources than more refined property governance structures. See Henry E.
Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategiesfor Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD.
453, 457 (2002) (emergence of property rights could also mean increased use of governance rules, i.e.,
rules that "pick out uses and users in more detail, imposing a more informational burden on a smaller
audience of duty holders").
138. Demsetz's article "said virtually nothing about the precise mechanism by which a society
determines that the benefits of property exceed the costs, other than to disclaim any position on whether
this would necessarily entail a 'conscious endeavor."' Merill, supra note 136, at 333.

Vol. 9

VIRGIMA JOURNAL OF LAw & TECHNOLOGY

No. 4

2004

Depoorter, The Sewral Lius ofMidceyMouse ExpandingIntledl Propt Law

34

3. The Evolutionary Mechanism of Intellectual Property Law
a. Introduction
The previous section states that property rights are a natural response to enhanced
economic prospects. However, according to Robert Merges, there is "nothing
foreordained about the future of the patent system, or of any other branch of the
[intellectual property] system for that matter." I argue that there actually is a degree of
determinacy in the evolution of the laws of intellectual property. The remainder of this
section proffers an evolutionary understanding of the social mechanisms underlying the
development of intellectual property law.
b. The Social
Expansion

Mechanics

of Intellectual

Property Law

In this section I argue that the evolution of the intellectual property law system
can best be understood as a "B2 -type process": two causal chains are triggered, each of
which affect the independent variable in opposing directions, leaving the net overall
effect indeterminate. 140 More specifically, of the two opposing mechanisms, the second
mechanism is triggered by the initial causal chain, leaving it impossible to predict the net
effect of the two opposing mechanisms. Applied to intellectual property law formation,
the expansion of protection for intellectual property rights holders triggers a counterreaction that moderates the initial increase of protection.
(1) Stage One: Perceiving Unrestricted Uses of New
Technology
as
an
Opportunity Cost
Traditionally, the first step in the causal mechanism of intellectual property
development is a demand by producers to strengthen intellectual property rights. The
previous section explained why property rights make sense in light of technological
improvements. However, there is a specific reason why a demand for the expansion of
intellectual property law is the initial response to technological advancements. With the
introduction of new technology, intellectual property law enters a stage of uncertainty. In
this phase of uncertainty, the default position will either entail a general perception that
(i) the new technology is encompassed by the present intellectual property law (the
default interpretation is one of analogy or precedent); or (ii) the new technology is
sufficiently different that such analogy is not obvious (the default position is
differentiation). When the technology is truly innovative, the legal status of uses of it will
be subject to substantial uncertainty. Even when involving resources that are governed by
bright-line regulation, the practical situation will be ambiguous as to the exact entitlement
of use rights.
Take the example of copyright law. Peer-to-peer networks, new sharing software,
139.
140.
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wide bandwidth Internet access, and novel compression formats (such as MP3 and DivX)
allow users to exchange and manipulate copyrighted content in ways and to degrees that
depart from standard notions of copyright rules of access to copyrighted material. In the
minds of (self-serving) end users, such novel uses are considered sharing and not piracy.
Peer-to-peer sharing activities are very different from the traditional notions of piracy.
Among other things, there is an absence of financial transactions, there are no
intermediaries, and the same technology can also be used to exchange non-copyrighted
material.
Generally, the introduction of new technology is followed by a phase of
unrestricted application of this technology to existing copyrighted work. This is partly
because the true nature of the problem only truly materializes in the minds of copyright
owners when these novel uses become widespread and more visible. 141 First it must
become apparent that free use of novel exchange mediums entails substantial opportunity
costs to producers, i.e. that there are gains to be internalized. For instance, the music
industry discovered that huge profits were to be made by transferring music in MP3
format over broadband networks, at a stage where such exchanges had become relatively
widespread on the Internet. 142 This triggered the initial action by copyright owners to
obtain formal enclosure of those novel uses within their privileges as copyright
holders. 143
In this first stage, litigation and lobbying by copyright owners often leads to
expansion of copyright law. 1 The Napster litigation led to the application of copyright
141. Historically, copyright owners have always tolerated minor infringements.
142. Consider the example of the introduction of compact disc technology: "Even with the
introduction and rapid popularity of digitally-encoded compact disks (CDs) and the proliferation of
microcomputers beginning in the early 1980s, the record industry did not appreciate the dramatic changes
that would be brought about by the emerging digital technologies." Menell, supra note 67, at 99.
143. For example, copyright owners sued the Sony Corporation because its new digital audio tape and
mini-disc technology enabled the production and reproduction of identical copies of authored works with
minimal loss of quality. Cahn v. Sony Corp., No 90-4537 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 9, 1990). This exercise
would be repeated with the introduction of DVD players. The RIAA, representing more than 500
companies engaged in the creation, manufacturing, and distribution of sound recordings, leads the way in
most of these efforts. This effort is compounded by inherent product uncertainty in content industries: "one
of the reasons that business people in Hollywood are so nervous is that they never really know what's
going to win or what's going to lose. They don't know what their markets and audiences really want; they
don't know how to adjust things in mid-stream. So there's constant pressure to make their systems more
efficient." Schmelzer, supra note 57 (quoting Siva Vaidhyanathan).
144. Consider, as examples, the successful litigation leading to a ban of unauthorized operation of
MP3.com's "private" storage lockers for purchased songs, see Brad King, RIAA Wins Suit Against
MP3.com,

WIRED

NEWS,

Apr.

28,

2000,

available at

http://www.wired.com/news/business/

0,1367,35933,00.html; the enjoining of the distribution of Streambox's Ripper software, which enabled the
recording and storage of streamlined material played on Real's audio and video players, see Clare Haney,
RealNetworks

Wins Injunction Against Streambox, IDG NEWS,

Dec.

28,

1999,

available at

http://www.computerworld.com/news/1999/story/0,11280,37969,00.html; RIAA's legal action against
MP3board.com's search engine for MP3 files, where the RIAA claimed that it is a violation of copyright
laws for a company to provide hyperlinks to publicly accessible Web sites where users can download files,
see Brad King, R1AA: No Hyperlinking Allowed, WIRED NEWS,

http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,37227,00.html;
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law to a new medium. Since Napster, sharing legitimately purchased content via peer-topeer exchange networks is deemed illegitimate.145 Previously the "first sale" doctrine
protected the right to sell or otherwise dispose of a personal copy that had been lawfully
acquired.146 As a result, the same borrowing of a compact disc from a friend becomes
infringement when conducted through a peer-to-peer network.
From this thesis it follows that most revolutionary jumps in technology are
followed by a period of non-applicability of intellectual property law and a time of openaccess sharing.147 Peer-to-peer technology is exemplary of new technology where the
synergy between technology and information content is a sufficient departure from prior
understandings of the applicability of copyright law. The transfer of copyrighted work on
peer-to-peer technology was originally left unfettered because it departed from the forprofit aspects that dominated the legal concept of "piracy." Initially, this brought about a
phase of non-applicability of intellectual property law. However, as the use of the
technology gained momentum, the line between unauthorized copying left unfettered and
large-scale for-profit piracy blurred. Because non-profit large scale copying l8 by end
users remained sufficiently different, the music and movie industry needed to demonize
the technology and voice existential outcries in order to convince courts to resort to
creative interpretation against the default position of unrestricted use. In doing so, music
and film producers have argued that peer-to-peer technology creates systemic
infringements that cumulatively would undermine the underlying industry and the future
supply of content. 149
Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff'd sub nom. Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (prohibiting the dissemination of DeCSS, the DVD decryption
program).
145. A preliminary injunction enjoined Napster from "engaging in, or facilitating others in copying,
downloading, uploading, transmitting, or distributing plaintiffs' copyrighted musical compositions and
sound recordings, protected by either federal or state law, without express permission of the rights owner."
A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
239 F.3d 1004, 1027-28 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding contributory infringement for facilitating direct
infringement by its users, with actual knowledge of infringing materials on its system, and finding against
fair use because of the commercial damage to the present and future nature of digital download markets).
Similar suits are now pending against other popular file sharing devices that emerged in the wake of
Napster. The record industry and Hollywood studios have joined forces to sue MusicCity, Kazaa and
Grokster. See John Borland, Suit Hits Popular Post-NapsterNetwork, CNET NEWS.COM, Oct. 3, 2001, at

http://news.com.com/2100-1023_3-273855.html.
146. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
147. This is the creative pooling that figures prominently in the views of Lawrence Lessig.
148. See Common Position No. 48/2000, recital 38, 2000 O.J. (C 344) 1. The number of Napster users
has been estimated at 64 million. Daily users of the other main peer-to-peer networks, such as Kazaa and
Morpheus, also are currently estimated at over 1 million.
149. The RIAA regularly calls attention to its commissioned reports on declining sales. See, e.g.,
Reuters, Labels Say Music Swaps Spur Sales Slump, CNET NEWS.COM, Aug. 26, 2002, available at

http:/news.com.com/2100-1023-955397.html (reporting a study indicating a decline of compact disc
shipments of 7 percent in the first six months of 2001 versus 2000); Margaret Kane, Is Napster Taking a
Toll on CD Sales?, ZDNET NEWS, May 24, 2000, available at http://zdnet.com.com/2100-11-521033.html

(in 1997-2000, sales of CDs within a five-mile radius of colleges declined 4 percent over the last two
years); Brad King, Napster: Music's Friend or Foe?, WIRED NEWs, June 14, 2000, available at

http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,36961,00.html
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The above leads to the following conclusions. First, it is not necessarily the case
that an unregulated environment creates the conditions for innovation; rather, it is the
nature of cutting-edge innovation itself that initially keeps new uses beyond the grasp of
intellectual property law. In its early stages ground-breaking technology necessarily finds
itself outside the confines of existing legal doctrine.
Second, given that under
conditions of ambiguity users of new technology act according to a default position of
free use and access to copyrighted content, it is to be expected that copyright owners seek
expansion. In doing so, producers set the initial agenda of litigationis5 and legislationl52
to establish the application of intellectual property laws to emerging technological
applications.153
(2) Second Stage: Loss Aversion
The expansion of intellectual property law triggers a counter movement. In
assuring the urgency of their plight, producers of intellectual property often overstate
their claims.154 When these demands result in the extension of intellectual property law,
had banned Napster from being used on school computers showed an 8 percent drop in sales from 1999 to
2000). Sale revenues from on-line purchases have increased. Yet, as Emusic.com chairman Robert Kohn
acknowledges, "[I]t's clear that CD sales would have been higher had file trading applications not been
around." Id. See also Graeme Wearden, Napster Blamed for Plunge in Singles Sales, ZDNET NEWS UK,

Feb. 26, 2001, available at http://news.zdnet.co.uk/story/o,,s2084666,00.html (noting RIAA statistics that
indicate the number of CD singles shipped in the United States in the year 2000 fell 39 percent).
150. The first phase of non-applicability of standing intellectual property law increases proportionately
with (i) the significance of the novelty in technological breakthroughs, and (ii) the level of specificity and
rules-based nature of the closest related law. In this regard the more detailed 1976 U.S. Copyright Act is
less conducive to a status quo in favor of copyright owners than the more open-ended 1909 Copyright Act.
151. Consider, for example, the legal battle waged by the RIAA against the MP3 player/recorder
"Rio." The RIAA accused Rio of violating the requirements for digital audio recording devices under the
Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, failing to employ a serial copyright management system, and failing
to pay royalties on sales of the digital audio recording device. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond
Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9thCir. 1999). The court dismissed the claim, holding that
general computer technology is not included in the AHRA. Id. at 1081. In these cases, judges are asked to
stretch the "limits of statutory language" through judicial interpretation and interpolation. Litman,
Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, supra note 64, at 857-58 & n.9 (citing U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE, BRIEFING PAPERS ON CURRENT ISSUES, reprinted in Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R.

2223 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House

Comm. on the Judiciary,94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2053 (1975)). According to Litman, courts continued to rely
on older precedent because of the confusion surrounding the 1976 Copyright Act. Litman, Copyright,
Compromise, and Legislative History, supra note 64, at 859. Much of the confusion arises from the fact

that the parties to the negotiation of 1976 agreed upon language "while disagreeing about what the
language meant." Id. at 861.
152. Producers regularly address legislators to obtain wholesale legislative amendments to existing
laws, or the creation of new legal rules. See, e.g., the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201
(2000).
153. Ginsburg colorfully describes this as a "Pavlovian" response to technology that involves new
means of making copies or communicating works. See Ginsburg, Bad Name, supra note 27, at 66.
154. Some argue that the content industries have a long-established tradition of exaggerating their
claims. Traditional print publishers argued that public libraries and photocopiers would undermine the
market for books and journals, and radios would kill the music industry. Later on, video cassette recorders
were claimed to be the death of the film and television industries. See, e.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The
Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L.
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this creates outlier cases that bring about strong images in the mind of the public.
Consider in this regard, the demand for royalties of ASCAP from the American Girl
Scouts movement for campfire performances of copyrighted songs.156 This case fueled
the fight of copyright users against strengthened protections and reinforced antitrust
awareness with respect to copyright collectives.
To the extent that free use develops
into a custom (Girl Scouts performing campfire songs, network users swapping files on
Napster, and so forth), the vigorous legal condemnation of these sharing norms among
users of copyright content will meet strong resistance. Ironically, by expanding
intellectual property law the norms that the legal rules are intended to modify might be
strengthened. ss As another example, imagine the passing of the Peer-to-Peer Piracy
REV. 263 (2002); see also Ginsburg, Bad Name, supra note 27. Ginsburg claims that overreaching occurs
by both copyright owners and consumers of copyrighted content and is explained by the same independent
variable: greed. Ginsburg, Bad Name, supra note 27, at 61. The author cites attempts to curb reverse
engineering and parodying as two prime examples of overreaching which put copyright owners in a bad
light. Id. at 66. End users and consumers, on the other hand, overreach when claiming that information
"wants to be free" and that they should therefore be allowed to freely share movies across peer-to-peer
networks. Id. at 62; see also Katyal, supra note 55 (the conflation of both uses of technology leads some to
assert the under-inclusiveness of intellectual property rights and others to err on the side of overinclusiveness, and that same technology which allows peer-to-peer exchange between recreators and
innovators is also the venue where piracy efforts are at a maximum).
155. But cf Merges, Solicitude, supra note 40, at 2239 (arguing that due to their intangible nature,
intellectual property rights expand conceptually and, consequently, face no "natural facts to act as a brake
on expansive notions of how broad a right might be, how many people and activities it might reach, or how
long it might last"). In concreto, this might make it difficult to "turn back a judicially initiated extension of
rights." Id. at 2240. Yet, conceptual expansion translates into real world consequences.
156. In 1996 ASCAP notified 8,000 summer camps that they must pay for using ASCAP songs in
public performances. The Girl Scout camps in California decided to purge their songbooks of many
copyrighted songs. The story received considerable media attention. See Lisa Bannon, The Birds May Sing,
But Campers Can't Unless They Pay Up, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 1996, at Al; Ken Ringle, Campfire Churls:
Publishing Group Seeks Royalties From Sing-Alongs, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 1996, at BI; Elisabeth
Bumiller, Battle Hymns Around Campfires: ASCAP Asks Royalties from Girl Scouts, and Regrets It, N.Y.

TIMES, Dec. 17, 1996, at Bl. On the reversal of this decision, see Patti Puckett, Warble away, ASCAP tells
Scouts, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Aug. 28, 1996, at 3A; Ken Ringle, ASCAP Changes Its Tune: Never Intended
to Collect Fees for Scouts' Campfire Songs, Group Says, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 1996, at C3.

157. Other recurring examples are the attempts to outlaw technology that accommodates infringement,
even though the technology accommodates legitimate uses. Examples of such dual use technologies include
time shifting in the case of home taping, and the exchange of non-copyrighted work or among copyright
owners such as young artists in the case of file sharing technology. Note also the proposal to enforce
copyright through the control of the architecture of digital technology, as found in Senator Ernest Hollings'
proposed Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act, S. 2048, 107th Cong. (2d Sess.
2002), available at http://www.politechbot.condocs/cbdtpa/hollings.s2048.032102.html. In this proposal,
the FCC and the Copyright Office would establish security system standards and encoding rules for all
digital media devices sold or offered for sale in the United States. Dual use technology was explicitly
protected in Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) ("Sony Betamax"),

where the Court recognized the doctrine of "substantial noninfringing use" to protect providers of products
that can be used for both legal and illegal purposes.
158. There is a growing acceptance of unauthorized distribution of music and films by millions of high
school and college students; this trend produces a generation of citizens who question the legitimacy of
copyright protection on the Internet. See John Schwartz, Trying to Keep Young Internet Users from a Life

of Piracy,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2001, at C1. Law makers should apply "gentle nudges" rather than "hard
shoves" to enforce a law that attacks a widespread social norm. See Dan Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard
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Prevention Act that proposes to provide immunity to activities that disable, block or

impair peer-to-peer networks and private individuals' home computers. 159 In the face of
such demands by copyright holders, users respond by applying pressure on the
intellectual property system for the reversal or moderation of those claims. 160
The overall evolution of intellectual property law thus represents a cyclical1 61
back and forth between initiatives on both sides of the private property and free use coin
of intellectual property.162 The evolution of technology is inherently uncertain. Content
producers fear that technology will allow systemic infringements that cumulatively
undermine their future.163 Consumers believe that this very technology will allow the
content industry to go beyond intellectual property laws and tighten stronger
monopolistic control.164
Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000) (examining the robustness of

social norms). This might apply in particular to the norms and customs of the sharing of copyrighted
material, as developed on cyberspace over peer-to-peer networks.
159. Rep. Howard L. Berman's Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act, H.R. 5211, 107th Cong. (2d Sess.
2002), available at http://www.house.gov/berman/newsroom/p2p.pdf, would exempt from liability
destructive acts of counter-circumvention where damage to computers is limited to $250. The Act does not
specify whether the planting of viruses, worms, denial-of-service attacks, or domain name hijacking would
be permissible. Although the Act states that "copyright-hackers" should not delete files, the right to sue of
anyone subject to an intrusion during which files are accidentally erased is limited. See Declan McCullagh,
Could Hollywood Hack Your PC?, CNET NEWS.COM, July 23, 2002, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023945923.html.
160. A broad range of interest groups provides opposing pressure. This includes, for example, the open
software movement, consumer protection groups, artists' rights, civil liberties, and the digital freedom
movement. See Boycott-RIAA.com, supra note 71. According to the Boycott-RIAA.com mission
statement, "Boycott-RIAA was founded because we love music. More and more the RIAA and the major
labels have attempted to lock up our culture and heritage through extensive lobbying, outrageous campaign
donations, misleading our political leaders, and lying to the public, while misrepresenting the facts.
Changing copyright law is not a solution for poor management. Copy protected CDs lock up the music
forever, even when the work in question returns to the public domain. This was not part of the copyright
bargain our forefathers struck, nor was it ever intended to provide income for the heirs of the copyright
holder. It is our intention to make the public, and our leaders[,] aware of the implications and long term
consequences to our culture of bowing to every demand the recording industry presents to our congress. It
is our intent to continue to unspin the spin and to represent the consumer and independent artists positions
on the battlefield that copyright has become." Id. at http://www.boycott-riaa.com/mission.
161. Such cyclical shifts also apply with regard to code. Code originates in an environment of free and
open-source use. As the value of a code increases, the code eventually is subjected to rights of exclusivity.
See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501 (1999).
162. To the extent that this countermovement is successful, we may retain some optimism towards the
capacity of the intellectual property system in accommodating conflicting interests of users and producers
of intellectual property. Cf Menell, supra note 67, at 195 n.465, citing William Eskridge, Politics without
Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation,74 VA. L. REV. 275 (1988)

(predicting that such conflicting demand patterns lead to regulatory resolutions).
163. "The problem is that the companies that invest so many millions of dollars in these high-end
commercial products - the sort of products the U.S. Government decided represented culture - stopped
believing in copyright. They stopped believing you could regulate culture softly and reasonably, because
they were afraid that digital technology would encourage us to undermine the market for those legitimate
goods." Schmelzer, supra note 57 (quoting Siva Vaidhyanathan).
164. Legislators who have proposed bills requiring the installation of restrictive security chips in all
hardware "'are basically legalizing tactics that are, for all intents and purposes, illegal for all other groups

Vol. 9

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF LAw & TECHNOLOGY

No. 4

2004

Depoorter, The Sewral Lius ofMidceyMouse ExpandingIn1dea l Propt Law

40

The question remains whether this process will necessarily generate a satisfactory
equilibrium.165 With regard to resource allocation efficiency, the outcome will depend on
institutional factors. Will participation of both opposing groups be equal before both
courts and legislators? Are both institutions equally geared to consider the claims of the
parties in the intellectual property law debate? Or, alternatively, will market interaction
abridge some of the interests through the development of norms, or other institutions?
With smooth, independent working legal institutions, intellectual property law
entitlements could arrive at the efficient equilibrium. Given uncertainty and transaction
costs, some have argued that courts are best equipped to solve the problems of the
adaptation of intellectual property law to technological evolution.166 This approach would
suggest the usage of open-ended laws, rather than detailed legislative initiatives such as
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act or the European Union Information Society
Directive.
The issue of the evolutionary adaptability of the intellectual property system does
not allow easy evaluation. Intellectual property systems have certainly expanded over
time. In light of the demands of an increasingly technologically complex society, a
certain degree of propertization is to be expected. But propertization triggers
counterclaims, resulting in indeterminate results as to whether a balance will be obtained.
to do. The media companies are launching a full-tilt assault on taking away fair-use rights from consumers.
The reason they are doing that (is because) they are after far greater amounts of control over how
consumers use media."' Brad King, Bracing for the Digital Crackdown, WIRED NEWs, Aug. 22, 2002,

available at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,54681,00.htnl (quoting Joe Kraus, co-founder of
the fair-use rights group DigitalConsumer.org).
165. For a relatively optimistic account, see Menell, supra note 67. The twenty-year extension of
copyright protection puts "pressure on the system to offset the gains in years with a diminution in the scope
of protection, for example, through a more vigorously implemented fair use exception, not only during the
last 20 years, but perhaps during the copyright term." Ginsburg, Bad Name, supra note 27, at 65. See also
the work of Robert Merges, e.g., Merges, New InstitutionalEconomics, supra note 14 (predicting efficient
institutions will emerge); Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules, supra note 28 (same); and Merges,
Solicitude, supra note 40 (noting the propensity of the common law to adapt to societal change). In some
way the type B2 process explanation peeks into the black box description of intellectual property law
formation, as "cyclical fluctuations between states of under- and overprotection are a characteristic
response to borderline subject matters that fit imperfectly within the classical patent and copyright
paradigms." Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 14, at 64.
166. Merges adopts a three-tiered theory of the adaptive propensity of intellectual property law: "(1) an
early period of disequilibrium, when new technology may produce widely divergent results; (2) an
extended period of adaptation, when general doctrines developed in earlier eras are applied and modified
on a case-by-case basis; and (3) legislative consolidation, in which a major statutory overhaul codifies
some of these doctrinal modifications. The overall effect of this three-stage process is the slow, steady
extension of property rights over the products of new technologies." Merges, Solicitude, supra note 40, at
2190. This is an argument for case-by-case evaluations (not unlike a percolation) prior to consolidation in
statutory acts. This implies that systems of judge-made law would be better suited to find a balance in
intellectual property law. See also Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743 (1995)

(arguing for a case-by-case formation of the legal foundation of cyberspace). But see Maureen O'Rourke,
Rethinking Remedies at the Intersection of Intellectual Property and Contract: Toward a Unified Body of

Law, 82 IOWA L. REv. 1137, 1140 (1997) [hereinafter O'Rourke, Rethinking Remedies] (urging that the
interaction between intellectual property law and contract law should be considered "comprehensively and
systematically now - before ad hoc judicial decisions impair the market for licensing intellectual property
rights").
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From a resource allocation efficiency perspective, the exact composition of the property
rights assignments, resulting from this process of propertization, will have differing
impacts on social welfare. This article will next explore the role of property rights, in
particular the right of exclusion, in the context of patents, copyrights, and trademarks.
III.

PROPERTY FRAGMENTATION: A

NEW PARADIGM IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

POLICY
This Part explores the possible societal ramifications of the proliferation of
intellectual property rights in relation to the economic concept of property fragmentation.
Part III.A demonstrates that extension of property right-protection onto increasingly
smaller units of intellectual goods is problematic, given the "multi-component" or
complementary nature of intellectual property goods. In Parts JJJ.B to JJJ.D,
fragmentation and complementarily (and the presence of institutional safeguards) are
explored with regard to the three main intellectual property rights.
This next section first examines in more detail the institutional framework of
patent law, copyright law and trademark lawl67 and relates these institutional parameters
to the concept of fragmentation. In each case I examine the presence of factors that might
mitigate wasteful fragmentation.
A. The Societal Effect of Propertization and Fragmentation of Intellectual
Property Rights
1. Fragmentation of the Public Domain
The expansion of intellectual property law fragments the domain of intellectual
property goods. The profusion of intellectual property rights divides the ownership of
expressions, innovations and words in two principal ways.
First, by creating new intellectual property rights on material previously outside
the scope of intellectual property law, new rights of exclusion are established on subject
matter that was previously governed by unrestricted rights of use. For example, new
database protection legislation provides effective exclusion rights to the creators, for
"sweat of the brow" compilations that were previously available for free use.168
Second, by enhancing and adding to existing protection, exclusionary rights are
added to the existing bundle of rights associated with those products. For instance, after
167. This thesis does not examine the effect and role of trade secrets. Trade secret law does not take
ideas or innovation out of the public domain because trade secret law does not provide owners with
protection against independent discovery. Liability for trade secret infringement occurs only in the context
of improper reverse engineering. Yet, in other ways trade secret is anathema to the norms of science
because it is premised on secrecy rather than disclosure, which altogether forecloses further research by the
wider scientific community. See Eisenberg,ProprietaryRights, supra note 60, at 206-07.
168. See Database Directive, supra note 14. The format, ordering and presentment of a database are
covered by copyright law.
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copyright added the moral right of alteration to the copyright bundle, a buyer of a
copyrighted work became confronted with an additional restriction on the use of the
property rights that remain exclusive to the copyright holder.
To understand the full complexity introduced with the expansion of intellectual
property law, one must appreciate that a discrete product consists of various inputs, each
of which is subject to individual property rights that are not necessarily held by one
individual or institution.169 The next section explores this issue in more detail.
2. The Divided Nature of Intellectual Property Goods
The economic analysis of intellectual property rights has largely ignored the
divided nature and complementary propensity of intellectual property. However, it is
important to note that there is "no simple 'one-to-one' mapping of products and property
rights." 170 As Merges notes:
A commercially viable product will often be assembled
from a number of components. One or more of these
components may be covered by IPRs [intellectual property
rights], but it is not always true that a complete product will
be covered by one, and only one, comprehensive IPR.
Complex, multi-component products are the norm in many
industries (e.g., autos and consumer electronics), and
individual patents often cover only a single component or
subcomponent. ... [M]ulti-component works are far from
uncommon. Indeed, motion pictures, sound recordings, and
magazines all have multiple "components" or inputs.1
Today's market for intellectual property is characterized by an increasing degree
of composite creation and innovation. Digital technology and ever-growing back
catalogues have allotted a greater creative role to the combination of intellectual property
works in the creative process. Digital production tools enable artists to produce derivative
works of art that combine cut and paste processing of samples, images, and sound effects
from other creative works. For example, in the case of DJ-mix compilations, artists
innovate by combining other artists' tracks in an original version.172 In a more profound
way, the very act of authorship is based on the works that preceded it. Every author
169. See Merges, New InstitutionalEconomics, supra note 14, at 1862 ("small specialty firms appear
to be increasing their share of overall R&D").
170. Id. at 1859 (critiquing the assumption implicit in the neo-classical economic model that "one, and
only one, property right covers the entirety of a marketable product," id., while pointing out, more
generally, the important role of institutions in the coordination of intellectual property rights).
171.

Id.

172. One of the most highly acclaimed DJ-mix albums, "2 Many DJ's: As Heard on Radio Soulwax,"
combines 114 songs of various artists into 46 tracks. Reportedly, the clearance of the rights on the songs,
featured on the album, lasted three years, involving 865 e-mails, 160 faxes and hundreds of telephone calls.
In the end 62 tracks were omitted from the album because the rights could not be obtained in time for those
tracks. See 2ManyDJs, at http://www.2manydjs.com/v2/frameset.htm.
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stands on the shoulders of his or her predecessors when adding an increment to the
creative domain. Litman notes:
Composers recombine sounds they have heard before;
playwrights base their characters on bits and pieces drawn
from real human beings and other playwrights' characters;
novelists draw their plots from lives and other plots within
their experience; software writers use the logic they find in
other software; lawyers transform old arguments to fit new
facts; cinematographers, actors, choreographers, architects
and sculptors all engage in the process of adapting,
transforming, and recombining what is already "out there"
in some other form.17 3
In this regard the public domain deserves appreciation as "a device that permits
the rest of the system to work by leaving the raw material of authorship available for
authors to use."174
Economic theory describes the potential societal costs of excessive property
fragmentation. 17 In the presence of complementarities, the use of resources
independently controlled by different individuals leads to underuse and overpricing.176
173.
174.

Litman, supra note 56, at 966-67 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 968.
175. Originally coined by Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967), Michael Heller
revitalized the concept of anticommons property. In an article on the transition to market institutions in
contemporary Russia, Heller discussed the intriguing prevalence of empty storefronts. Stores in Moscow
were subject to underuse because there were too many owners (local, regional and federal government
agencies, Mafia, etc.) holding rights of exclusion. As employed by Heller, the definition of the
anticommons as "a property regime in which multiple owners hold effective rights of exclusion in a scarce

resource," provides a powerful tool for property theory. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the
Anticommons: Property in the Transitionfrom Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 639 (1998). For a

recent treatment of the danger of over-fragmentation, see, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of
Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163 (1999) (recognizing a "boundary principle" in property law that
purports to prevent excessive fragmentation and criticising the Supreme Court's violation of the above
principle by way of protecting increasingly minimal property fragments in a recent number of cases). See
also Michael A. Heller & Rebecca Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998) (cautioning against the stationary effects of upstream

patents on downstream patent markets); Douglas Lichtman, Property Rights in Emerging Platform
Technologies, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 615 (2000) (identifying externalities in emerging markets of platform
technology and peripheral sellers); Depoorter & Parisi, Fair Use and Copyright Protection:A Price Theory

Explanation, supra note 29 (upholding the usefulness - from a strategic costs perspective - of fair use in
copyright law in the digital era); Thomas J. Miceli & C.F. Sirmans, Partition of Real Estate; or, Breaking
Up Is (Not) Hard to Do, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 783 (2000) (examining the modern statutory remedy that
allows courts to order forced sale of an undivided land under joint ownership).
176. James Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons, 43 J. L. &
ECON. 1 (2000) (demonstrating that the price charged by complementary monopolists is higher than that of

a single agent monopolist); Norbert Schulz, Francesco Parisi & Ben Depoorter, Fragmentationin Property:
Towards a General Model, 158 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 594 (2002) (proposing that the
anticommons deadweight losses are an increasing function in the following three factors: (a) number of
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The problem of fragmentation derives from a positive externality due to complementary
features of exclusive use rights. The right to exclude is embedded in the control that each
property owner exercises over the use of the common resource by other agents. Property
excluders do not capture the external effects of their individual decisions. This leads to an
excessive level of exclusion, with underutilization of the joint property as a result. When
ex post opportunities arise which require exclusive use of various individual property
rights on a land parcel, these various fragments become complementary inputs into a
more productive unit. Deadweight losses of underutilization or underinvestment occur
when transaction costs create an impediment for an effective rebundling of
complementary inputs.
Of course, according to Coase's theorem, such initial partitioning of property
rights does not matter for the allocation of resources when all rights are freely
transferable and transaction costs are zero.
Reaggregation into clusters through
voluntary transactions between the individual owners will maximize total value of the
resources. Once the ideal conditions of the positive Coase theorem are relaxed, overfragmentation poses an engaging incident of "asymmetric transaction costs."17 ' The
presence of such asymmetry is due to the fact that the reunification of fragmented rights
usually involves transaction and strategic costs of a greater magnitude than those incurred
for the original fragmentation of the right. The intuition for such asymmetry is quite
straightforward. A single owner faces no strategic costs when deciding how to partition
his property. Conversely, multiple non-conforming co-owners are faced with a strategic
problem, given the interdependence of their decisions. These strategic costs increase the
transaction costs of any attempted reunification of the fragments into a unified bundle.
For composite creation and innovation, fragmented exclusion rights are
problematic when we contemplate market failure in the licensing and negotiation of
future allocations of use rights. The problem results from the complementary nature of
many individual works of intellectual property. In the context of copyrightable content,
this often means that "every author is also a user of prior works."179 In effect, the extreme
propertization of each of those individual contributions creates a setting where any
subsequent author is at risk of being excluded from all possible sources of inspiration.
In this context, the real property analogy, previously associated with the case for
the expansion of intellectual property law, works in the opposite direction: "If every
valuable interest constituted property, then practically any act would result in either a
trespass on, or taking of, someone's property ...."18o
property fragments; (b) degree of complementarity of such fragments in subsequent uses; and (c)
independence of the pricing of such inputs by the fragmented property owners).
177.
178.

Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &ECON. 1 (1960).
Francesco Parisi, The Asymmetric Coase Theorem: Dual Remedies for Unified Property, GEORGE
MASON LAW & ECONOMICs RESEARCH PAPER No. 01-13, at 1 (2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.corn

paper.taf?abstract id=264314.
179. Lemley, Romantic Authorship, supra note 9, at 885.
180. Kenneth Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the
Modern Concept of Property, 29 BuFF. L. REV. 325, 329 (1980) (cited in BOYLE, supra note 50, at 48;
duplicated in Lemley, Romantic Authorship, supra note 9, at 885).
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In the application of strict intellectual property rights to the Internet, a multitude
of conflicts between overlapping rights might arise. That is because cyberspace consists
of overlapping rights whereby a "single act of transmission or browsing on the Net can
potentially violate all of the exclusive rights listed in the Copyright Act .... 181
More generally, while the allocation of property-right entitlements may provide
an incentive for truly original work, it threatens to lower creativity involving original
combinations of works in the arts and sciences.182 On a societal level this threatens to
undermine the capacity of each potential user to "partake" in the common cultural and
scientific conversation.' 8 3
In order to evaluate the problem, the next sections will consider in more detail the
level of exclusionary rights currently present in the property rights bundles of patents,
copyrighted content and trademarks.
B. Patent Law
1. Patent Law and Exclusion Rights
A patent provides an inventor with the exclusive right against all unauthorized
uses of the patented product.184 Exclusion rights are considerable under patent protection.
Other potential users of the resource are constrained not only from manufacturing, but
also from using, selling, or importing the resource without prior consent from the patent
holder.1s A patentee's exclusive right extends to identical inventions, regardless whether
these inventions were copied from the patent and irrespective of any good faith intentions
on the part of the patent infringer. In addition, the doctrine of "equivalent patents"
extends the control rights of the patentee beyond the terms of the patent description.
Under this doctrine the holder may exclude the development of all subsequent, similar,
non-identical, useful inventions.
The scope of a patent is the crucial determinant of the scope of an individual
181.

Mark Lemley, Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 547,

549 (1997). See also Niva Elkin-Koren, supra note 9, at 82, 99 ("recent litigation and court decisions could
chill investors away from what would be perceived as legally risky technologies, thus shrinking the
invested resources in the development of new technologies and business practices, which might threaten the
right holders' position"). This illustrates the collective action nature of the problem of exclusive rights in
intellectual property rights.
182.

Katyal, supra note 55, at 1482, with reference to VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 30, at 143-44

(outlining case law that resulted in lower levels of sampling in recorded works of music). See also
Rosemary Coombe, Left Out on the Information Highway, 75 OR. L. REV. 237 (1996).

183. Benkler, supra note 64, at 576 (advocating sustaining a commons in resources for the production
and exchange of information and free access models).
184.

See generally CHISUM, supra note 33; CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW (Martin Adelman

et al. eds., 2002).
185. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a), 271(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). This stands in contrast to most other
areas of intellectual property law, where only some unauthorized uses are prohibited. Consider for instance
the exceptions in copyright law, such as the fair use and first-sale doctrines, 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-12. Also,
wrongful intent is not a condition for infringement.
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patent's exclusionary right. When a patentee argues that his patent has been infringed, he
or she needs to demonstrate that the infringer's patent or use falls within the boundaries
of the claimant's prior, protected patent. The initial decision on patent scope is made by
the patent claimant.186 This decision is subject to the scrutiny of the Patent Office, which
verifies whether the claimed invention meets the statutory requirements of novelty, nonobviousness, utility, and enablement.18 7 If a patent infringement is litigated, these aspects
are re-evaluated by the court. Because of the strict liability nature of patent
infringements, the patentee will in effect enjoin the unauthorized manufacturing, use,
sale, or importation by the infringer. As such, the legal protection of the patent system
creates the conditions for the exercise of significant rights of exclusion in inventions.
2. Formal Example
The exclusivity awarded by a patent becomes a crucial factor when a prospective
follow-up inventor needs to rely on prior, patented inventions for his own research.
Consider the following formal illustration by Schulz et al.189 When two firms each hold a
patent in a technology that requires the use of both (complementary) patents, any third
party desiring use of the technology will need to obtain access to both patents. Suppose
that there is a continuum of such third-party firms where each firm is characterized by its
willingness (w) to pay for the use of the two patents. Let w be uniformly distributed
across [0, 1]. Suppose the patent-holding firm i asks a price pi for a license to use its
patent. Hence the price to be paid to both patent-holding firms is pi + P2. All third party
firms with a willingness to pay at least such amount will ask for a license from both
firms. Given the assumption that on the distribution of the potential licensees the demand
for patents is 1 - (pi + p2), patent-holding firm 1 has a profit of
pi(1 - (P1 +P2))

There is an analogous expression for firm 2. The decision to set a price for a
186. Almost universally a patent claim consists of (i) a specification of the invention that describes the
problem and solution-process which allows others to reproduce the invention; and (ii) the claim, which
specifies the application's proposed scope of the invention and allows delineation of the invention from the
existing state of the art.
187. See, respectively, 35 U.S.C §§ 102(a), (e), (g); 103; 101; and 112. Similarly, European patent
applications must meet the substantive requirements of novelty (not part of the state of the art), involve an
inventive step (not obvious to a person skilled in the art), and must be susceptible to industrial application.
See Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, art. 52, 13 I.L.M. 271 [hereinafter
European Patent Convention]. For a summary, see TRITTON, supra note 7, at 88-123.
188. Robert P. Merges, Intellectual PropertyRights and BargainingBreakdown: The Case of Blocking
Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 77 (1994) [hereinafter Merges, Blocking Patents]: "The basic rule [in patent

law] is that the rightholder has an almost absolute right to obtain an injunctive remedy against the
infringer." See also Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and IntellectualProperty, 94 COLUM. L.

REV. 2655, 2667 & n.44 (1994) [hereinafter Merges, Coase], citing Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co.,
718 F.2d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 996 (1983) ("[W]ithout the right to obtain an
injunction, the right to exclude granted to the patentee would have only a fraction of the value it was
intended to have, and would no longer be as great an incentive to engage in the toils of scientific and
technological research").
189. Schulz, Parisi & Depoorter, supra note 176, at 600-01.
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license can be modeled again as a Nash equilibrium of a simultaneous move game. The
equilibrium value of both prices is 1/3 such that both licenses cost 2/3.
Suppose now that both patents are in the hands of just one firm that demands a
price of P for a license on both patents. Then the profit of this firm will be
P(1 -P)

This profit will be maximized at P = 2. Hence, fragmentation raises the price for
both licenses. This induces some firms not to employ the technology. Therefore
fragmentation decreases the value created by the technology.
3. The Imperfect Patent Licensing Market
As discussed in Part II, parties that hold complementary inputs may fail to
maximize the total value of resources because of transaction costs or strategic behavior.
In the particular case of patent licenses, there are several factors that further complicate
the licensing process between a patent holder and an improver or follow-up inventor.
a. The Unpredictable Path of Innovation
Research on patentable inventions entails a significant degree of ex ante
uncertainty. 190 It is unduly hard to predict inventions in advance or to estimate the value
of inventions with some degree of success. 191 Historic examples of the difficulty of
getting to an accurate estimation of the expected value of present inventions include
IBM's underestimation of the future market for home computers. 192
Uncertainty as to the value of an invention also extends to a follow-up invention.
The usefulness of a patented good in the licensee's context is subject to another layer of
uncertainty when applied to the context of the licensor's invention.
These high levels of uncertainty regarding the value of a patent will make a
prospective licensee cautious and reluctant in the negotiation of a licensing price. When
190. Merges, Employee Inventions, supra note 90, at 23.
191.
Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV.
989, 1049 & n.280 (1997) [hereinafter Lemley, Economics of Improvement] (referring to the literature that
illustrates the computational problems firms have in the management of intra-firm inventions: Steven A.
Lippman et al., Heterogeneity Under Competition, 29 ECON. INQUIRY 774 (1991); Michael E. Porter, The
Structure Within Industries and Companies' Performance, 61 REV. ECON. & STAT. 214 (1979); David J.
Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, Collaboration, Licensing
and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL. 285 (1986)).
192. Merges, Blocking Patents, supra note 188, at 86 n.41, citing NATHAN ROSENBERG, EXPLORING
THE BLACK Box: TECHNOLOGY, ECONOMICS AND HISTORY 220 (1994): "The computer was regarded by its
inventors as a purely scientific device ..." (quoting Barbara G. Katz & Almarin Phillips, The Computer
Industry, in GOVERNMENT AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS 162, 171 (Richard R. Nelson ed., 1982)). See also
JON ELSTER, EXPLAINING TECHNICAL CHANGE 111 (1983); JOEL MOKYR, THE LEVER OF RICHES:
TECHNOLOGICAL CREATIVITY AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS 154 (1990); CHRISTOPHER FREEMAN, THE
ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION 75 (2d ed. 1982).

Vol. 9

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF LAw & TECHNOLOGY

No. 4

2004

Depoorter, The Sewral Lius ofMidceyMouse ExpandingIn1eahlPropt Law

48

both parties' expectations diverge too widely, no licensing agreement may be reached. 193
Moreover, as experimental research has demonstrated, uncertainty has a magnifying
effect on reservation prices.194 Highly detailed contracts might ameliorate the problem,
but integrating all possible contingencies into contracts is costly and not all eventualities
are foreseeable. 195
b. Product Complexity
Due to the technical and complex nature of patented products, intellectual
property licenses are highly complex and more costly than regular licenses.196 In the case
of technology licenses, transaction costs amount to 20% of the total value of the
underlying license.197 These licensing contracts regularly include complex assignments of
partial legal rights, and long-term agreements that regulate the future and ongoing
relationship between the licensee and licensor.
c. Valuation and the Information Paradox
Licensing agreements encounter specific problems in the valuation of patents. The
uniqueness of every individual invention prevents parties from accurately estimating the
"cost of a license on the value of the right licensed."198 Moreover, it is hard to place
separate values on relative contributions of the pioneer and improver, in combination
with the uncertainty of the technology prospects of development and profitability. 199
87

The information problem is even more complex in the course of license
negotiations involving potential rather than actual improvers. 200 In such a context parties

193.

On the dynamics of bargaining breakdown, see generally Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J.

LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982); Robert Cooter et al., Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of
Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982).

194. In cases of uncertainty, the anticommons pricing effect is amplified. The results in Depoorter &
Vanneste suggest that licensors ignore the expected value of the licensee's project, and instead focus on the
upper range of profitability of surplus. Willingness to accept seems to be anchored to a proportion of the
maximum profitability, rather than a proportion of the expected benefits of the project. In one particular
experiment the total uncoordinated reservation price of all licensors was seven times above the expected
value of the project. In the experiment this created a serious gap between the amount licensor's holders
were asking, on the one hand, and what a third-party entrepreneur could reasonably offer, on the other
hand. See Ben W.F. Depoorter & Sven Vanneste, Putting Humpty Dumpty Back Together: An
Experimental Test of the Anticommons, CASLE WORKING PAPER #14 (2003) (on file with author).

195.

"[I]n order for the parties to divide the gains from trade, they must know what those gains are,"

Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 191, at 1055.
196. Id. at 1053.

197.

Id. at 1053-54.

198.
199.

Id. at 1053.
Merges, Blocking Patents,supra note 188, at 75.

200. Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 191, at 1051. On the interaction between initial
inventors and improvers in science, see, e.g., Suzanne Scotchmer & Jerry R. Green, Novelty and Disclosure
in Patent Law, 21 RAND J. EcON. 131 (1990); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants:
Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. EcON. PERSP. 29 (1991); Jerry R. Green & Suzanne
Scotchmer, On the Division ofProfit in Sequential Innovation, 26 RAND J. EcON. 20 (1995).
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face what is known as Arrow's information paradox. 201 The actual improver possesses
valuable information that he would like to disclose to the patent owner in exchange for
money.202 However, the exchange cannot occur before the original owner is in a position
to evaluate the information, while at the same time, under prospect theory, 203 this would
entail that the patent owner is free to use the patented information once she finds out what
the improvement consists of.204
d. The Conundrum of Potential Prospect Inventors
For potential improvers, licensing is especially difficult when transaction costs (1)
are higher than perceived (but overly pessimistic) evaluations of the value of
improvements; or (2) lead improvers ex ante to forego improvements in the advent of
these transaction costs.205 Both these options create deadweight losses due to the
misperception of either the value of the improvements or the magnitude of the transaction
costs. Both are a subset of the more general condition of uncertainty.
As such, these observations give pause to pessimism as to the likelihood that
follow-up innovators and improvers, actual and potential, will be successful in obtaining

201. 4 KENNETH
INFORMATION 222-24

J. ARROW, COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW: THE ECONOMICS OF
(1984). Arrow's paradox encapsulates the notion that imperfect information of
another's utility function inhibits the ideal Coasian bargaining model.
202. Merges, Blocking Patents, supra note 188, at 81. Arrow's paradox also provides a case for the
existence of blocking patents.
203. Under prospect theory, the patent system provides incentives but is based on the ability of
intellectual property ownership to drive the efficient use of inventions and creations through licensing. The
patent system rewards not future investors but instead insures "further commercialization and efficient use
of as yet unrealized ideas by patenting them, just as privatizing land will encourage the owner to make
efficient use of it." Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 191, at 1046. In this manner the patent
system is analogous to mineral claims. The pioneering work is Kitch, Nature and Function, supra note 62.
204. The problem of negotiation of an improver with a pioneer represents a "Catch-22" problem. In
Joseph Heller's classic novel, Yossarian, a Word War II bombardier, was too smart to die but not smart
enough to find a way out of his predicament: "Orr would be crazy to fly more missions and sane if he
didn't, but if he was sane he had to fly them. If he flew them he was crazy and didn't have to; but if he
didn't want to he was sane and had to. Yossarian was moved very deeply by the absolute simplicity of this
clause of Catch-22 and let out a respectful whistle." JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22, at 55 (1961). To a certain
extend, this dilemma is recognized in intellectual property law doctrine. The balance between the
protection of the right of present innovators and future talents features strongly in the "doctrine of
improvement" of patent law. What is improvement and what is imitation? Too much freedom to improvers
(imitators?) will discourage future development, while granting too much protection to the original parties
may halt development of new products. See Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 191 (arguing
that patent doctrines of blocking-patents and the reverse doctrine of equivalents should apply equally to the
realm of copyright law, because the various imperfections in the licensing markets, e.g., transaction costs
and strategic behavior, will discourage copyright improvements): "Some improvements fall within the
scope of the preexisting intellectual property right, either because of an expansive definition of that right or
because economic or technical necessity requires that the improver hew closely to the work of the original
creator in some basic respect. Here, the improver is at the mercy of the original intellectual property owner,
unless there is some separate right that expressly allows copying for the sake of improvement" (footnotes
omitted). Id. at 991.
205. Id. at 1055.
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the patent rights to combine into their own research.206
4. Safeguards and Legal Caps on Dysfunctional Fragmentation of
Innovation
The problematic nature of exclusivity of innovation of the patent system depends
largely on the institutional framework of patent law. As Merges notes, "sensitivity to the
life of a property right after it is initially granted - the pattern of transactions in which it
is exchanged, and the institutions that may grow up to facilitate this exchange - reveal
much about the optimal nature of the right." 207
There are a number of factors that may mitigate the problem of fragmentation.
Whether these rules and institutions are sufficient to overcome most instances of
underuse and underinvestment is an empirical matter. For the moment, it will be useful to
identify rules in patent law that might ameliorate the anticommons problems.
9i Most importantly, patent rights are subject to a limited duration.208 After
expiration of the statutory period 209 patent technology reverts to the public domain, where
it may be freely used to infuse the future innovation.
194 Under the doctrines of "first-sale" and "exhaustion" a lawful purchaser is
permitted to use and resell patent technology without the patentee's permission. 210 These
doctrines apply only to situations where the patent has been sold.

The doctrine of patent misuse prevents cases where patents are used as leverage
for the purchase of a monopoly in different product markets.211
Under the doctrine of "blocking patents" the holder of the narrower
("subservient") patent cannot practice the invention without a license from the holder of
the dominant patent, while at the same time, the holder of the dominant patent cannot
integrate the improved feature without a license. Thus, in cases where the alleged
infringer holds a narrow patent on an improved feature of the broader, allegedly

206. Merges, New InstitutionalEconomics, supra note 14, at 1860-61 (with reference to the work of
Scotchmer and Green).
207. Id. at 1862.
208. "[A]ll idea property return[s] to the common automatically at some point." Hughes, supra note 6,
at 323 (emphasis in original).
209. Article 33 of the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, prescribes a minimum period of 20 years from
the date of filing. There is no maximum period. See also European Patent Convention, supra note 187, at
art. 63 (stipulating 20 years). Under national law and EC legislation, protection is extended for
pharmaceutical products, because marketing is often delayed by regulatory procedures. In the United
States, the 20-year duration of protection for patents is provided by 35 U.S.C. § 154.
210.

See CHISUM, supra note 33, at 976-77.

211. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d); For a criticism, see Mark Lemley, The Economic Irrationalityof the Patent
Misuse Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1599 (1990). For the European context of antitrust enforcement, see
TRITTON, supra note 7, at 563-730.
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infringed-upon patent, patent law places the parties in a bilateral monopoly. 212 The
doctrine of "blocking patents" presents each party with both a carrot and a stick in the
negotiations. Yet a blocking patent situation may develop into an anticommons when a
third party wants to obtain two complementary patents that are blocked.213
Under the "reverse doctrine of equivalents" no infringement will be found if the
innovation carries a significant contribution that takes the invention outside of the
original, allegedly infringed-upon patent. 214 When there are substantial technological
advancements at stake, patent law thus eliminates the veto rights of complementary right
holders (monopoly or bilateral monopoly). In cases of significant technical achievements,
the reverse doctrine of equivalents acts as a merit-based type of fair use and trumps the
right to exclude. This will likely encourage more voluntary licensing in cases where a
pioneer and an improver hold exclusive rights in a complementary unit.215 The doctrine
may act as a potential threat to moderate the expected value of the pioneer and might thus
create a "bargaining overlap" between the pioneer and improver.216
Similar to a fair-use defense, patent law encapsulates an "experimental use"
exception for patented technology.217 This doctrine is, however, restricted to instances
where the experimentation does not further the legitimate business interest of the
potential infringer.218
Unlike copyrighted works, patents do not lend themselves well to pooling by
intermediaries. Licensing patents in bulk is extremely difficult because of the more
complicated nature of patents and inventions. In particular, improvements are hard to
categorize. Assessing fees for individual uses might be very tricky.219 There is historical
evidence of a collective exchange pooling in the automobile and aircraft industries, albeit
only after many years of "significant litigation and refusal to license" between the main
competitors.220 Also, the rapid turnover rate associated with the software and
biotechnology industries prevents the existence of "close-knit" communities that are

212. See Merges, Blocking Patents, supra note 188, at 82-83; Merges & Nelson, supra note 37, at 86061.
213. Note that the process that unites "blocked" patents does not necessarily extend to third-party
prospective licensees.
214. Merges & Nelson, supra note 37, at 862-68.
215. Merges, Blocking Patents,supra note 188, at 76-102 (offering examples of bargaining breakdown
as a case for reverse equivalents).
216.
217.

Id. at 95-99.
See generally CHISUM, supra note 33, at 355-68.

218.

See Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

See also

Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progressof Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989); Jordan P. Karp, Note, Experimental Use as Patent Infringement: The
Impropriety of a Broad Exception, 100 YALE L.J. 2169 (1991).
219.
Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 191, at 1054.

220. Rai, supra note 94, at 130. However, the conditions for the emergence of pooling equilibria are
not present in all industries. Especially with regard to inventions with high valuation uncertainty, such as
those found in the biotechnology industry, pooling equilibria are precarious. For a discussion of the
emergence of a pooling situation in the automobile and aircraft industry, see id. at 129-32.
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conducive to the emergence of such pools. 221
As a last resort, the anticommons bottleneck might be overcome by more direct
regulatory interventions such as compulsory licensing.222 However, some have argued
that compulsory licensing has never been successful in the patent context. 223 The
licensing of patents generally involves transfers of unique, highly specialized
technologies, the valuation of which relies on prior experience. Non-voluntary licensing
may thus give rise to cases of over- or under-compensation and tilt the balance toward
"party-to-party valuation,"224 a perspective similar to the general specific performance
bias in economic scholarship of contract law. 225 Furthermore, some have argued that
transaction costs and bargaining problems do not bar exchanges but instead lead parties
to invest in institutions that lower the costs of exchanges.226 Compulsory licensing
solutions might thus prevent the emergence of these efficiency-enhancing institutions.

221. Maureen O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177,
1245 (2000). But see Rai, supra note 94 (on sharing research norms in the field of biotechnology); Merges,
Property Rights Theory and the Commons, supra note 16 (describing a dual-commons regime scientists

share among each other while enforcing property rights against commercial actors).
222. See Jerome H. Reichman & Catherine Hasenzahl, Non-voluntary Licensing of Patented
Inventions, in UNCTAD/ICTSD CAPACITY BUILDING PROJECT ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
(2003),
available at
http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsd-series/iprs/

CS reichman hasenzahl.pdf (providing an historical perspective, reflections on the TRIPS framework, and
a discussion of licensing practices in Canada and the United States); Jerome H. Reichman & Catherine
Hasenzahl,

Non-voluntary Licensing of

Patented Inventions:

The

Canadian Experience,

in

UNCTAD/ICTSD
AND

CAPACITY BUILDING PROJECT ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2002), available at http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/docs/

reichman hasenzahlCanada.pdf (describing bargaining outcomes and compulsory licensing applications
in Canada). Also, the laws of a number of European countries provide for a system of compulsory licensing
of a patent where there is no manufacture of the patented product in the country and demand is being
fulfilled by importation. Such systems are limited by the EU rules on non-discrimination, competition law
(see TERENCE PRIME, EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 29-74 (2000)), and the TRIPS Agreement,
supra note 7, at art. 31 (discussing minimum rights regarding remuneration and duration for the grantee of
the compulsory licenses). See also the European rules on "compulsory cross licensing" in the context of
complementary rights of plant variety and patent protection. In the situation where the owner of one right
requires the consent of the other right's owner to commercialize a product "on reasonable terns," a license
is compulsory when the license is "necessary" for the exploitation of the plant or plant variety. Directive
98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the Legal Protection of
Biotechnological Inventions, art. 12, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13 [hereinafter Biotech Directive].
223. F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 456 (2d ed.
1980) (linking failures to the pressure from the industry and the patent bar). See also Merges & Nelson,
supra note 37, at 840.
224.

Merges, Blocking Patents,supra note 188, at 99-102.
See Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance,45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351 (1978); Alan Schwartz,
The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979); Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific
Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341 (1984). But see
Edward Yorio, In Defense of Money DamagesforBreach of Contract, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (1982).

225.

226. Such is the operating hypothesis of much of the work of Robert Merges. See Merges, Coase,
supra note 188, at 2668.

Vol. 9

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF LAw & TECHNOLOGY

No. 4

2004

Depoorter, The Sewral Lius ofMidceyMouse ExpandingIn1eahlPropt Law

53

C. Copyright Law
1.

Copyright Law and Exclusion Rights

Copyright law protects the expression of ideas.227 An expression must contain a
certain degree of originality and it must result from the author's efforts. Once these
conditions are fulfilled, the author benefits from copyright protection without any further
formal requirements.
Copyright law grants authors five exclusive rights, each subject to certain
exceptions: 1) the right to reproduce in copies or phonorecords (right of reproduction); 228
2) the right to prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work (the adaptation
right);229 3) the right to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfers of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending (the right of
distribution); 230 4) the right to perform the work in public (right of public
performance);231 and 5) the right to display the work in public (the right of public
232
Copyright's exclusionary rights are enforced by temporary and final
display).
injunction. This is also due to the fact that damages are hard to prove, and undercompensation is likely.233
2. A Formal Model
Consider the copyright law problem faced by an author in his dealings with a
book publisher. Suppose that the author wants to sell his copyright to the book for price
P2 per copy sold. The publisher expects the demand for the book to be 1 - p1, where p1 is
the price the publisher charges. Aside from costs, the profit of the publisher is thus
(P1 -P2)G -P1)

and the profit of the author is
p2(
227.

-Pl)-

On the similarities and overlap between subject matter and social utility of patents and copyrights,

see Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 191, at 1034-38.

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

17 U.S.C.
17 U.S.C.
17 U.S.C.
17 U.S.C.
17 U.S.C.

§ 106(1).
§ 106(2).
§ 106(3).
§ 106(4).
§ 106(5).

233. "'Courts exercise their statutory authority to grant temporary injunctive relief more readily in the
context of copyright actions than in any other intellectual property cases."' Merges, Coase, supra note 188,
at 2667 (quoting 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 11.0, at 247-48
(1989)). See also PETER STONE, COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY 91 (1990) (stating that the "grant of a final injunction to a successful copyright plaintiff is
almost automatic, since its refusal would amount to judicial connivance at the compulsory purchase by the
defendant, without statutory authority, of the plaintiff's proprietary rights"); European Union Information
Society Directive, supra note 26, at art. 8(1) (reinforcing the strength of remedies in the digital context by
providing that remedies must be "effective, proportionate and dissuasive").
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If the author commits first to a price, a natural assumption in this context, the
pricing decision can be described by the Nash equilibrium of a two-stage game.
Equilibrium values are 2 for P2 and for p1. If the author had the opportunity to market
the book himself the price would be 2. Once again the fragmentation of rights results in a
higher price and sub-optimal use of the intellectual property - in this example a decrease
of potential readership.234
3. Safeguards
The exclusionary effect of copyright law is moderated in that it does not protect
against independent development. A copyright holder needs to assert actual reliance on
the part of the alleged copyright infringer.235
A number of aspects of current copyright law have received criticism. According
to Elkin-Koren, much of the expansion of copyright is due to the erosion of the ideaexpression dichotomy.236 Allegedly, today's standard of originality is one of origin, not
novelty. A work receives copyright protection when it has not been copied from another
- -237
source and involves a minimum of creativity. But it must be an expression and not an
idea; the expression itself is what is protected then. By blurring this distinction, the scope
of property rights is considerably extended.238 By reinforcing a stricter requirement of
novelty, the reach of copyright law could be contained.
Some have argued in favor of
protection. Lawrence Lessig advances
instance via a process of compulsory
"reasonable" royalty rates to compensate

limiting copyright remedies to liability rule
such "compensation without control,,239 for
licensing, where the government could set
artists while assuring access for the community

234. See Schulz, Parisi & Depoorter, supra note 176.
235. 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 233, § 7.2.2, at 19. This stands in contrast to patent law, which does not
discriminate among independent development, and instead treats all use as infringing. Also, patent law does
not contain any use defenses. For an innovative proposal that allies patent law with copyright law in this
regard, see O'Rourke, supra note 221, at 1245. But for a rationalization of the many differences in the laws
of patents and copyright law, see John Shepard Wiley Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent,58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 119, 182-83 (1991), who characterizes the observed differences as a "simple matter of volume": "The
nation in its entire history has granted only 5.27 million patents. It would not be surprising if a country of a
quarter of a billion people created that number of different written documents, photographs, and works of
art and music in a single day" (emphasis in original).
236.

Niva Elkin-Koren, Of Scientific Claims and Proprietary Rights: Lessons from the Dead Sea

Scrolls Case, 38 Hous. L. REV. 445 (2001). Under what is called "the law of ideas," the United States case
law has provided individuals the protection of ideas as mere personal property. These cases typically
involve situations where individuals, unaffiliated with companies, produce ideas and submit them to
corporations, who use the ideas without authorization or compensation. See M. EPSTEIN, MODERN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 259-99 (2d ed. 1992) (citing case law which imposes requirements of novelty
and concreteness on the protection of ideas, including Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 13
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1497 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1990) and Murray v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 844 F.2d 988
(2d Cir. 1988)).
237. "Copyright protection shall extend to expressions and not to ideas, procedures, methods of
operation or mathematical concepts as such." TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 9(2).
238. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 236.
239. Katyal, supra note 55, at 1474.
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of users and prospective inventors. 240
4. The Emergence of Efficient Institutions: Copyright Pooling
As illustrated above, part of the problem with the anticommons in copyright law
results from the fact that the fragmented group of copyright holders fails to coordinate the
pricing of their licenses.
Collective rights organizations act as intermediaries between the right holders
(supply) and individual users (demand). The potential availability of a single avenue to
purchase the complementary rights might, varying with the inclusiveness of the
intermediaries' rights collection, solve the problems documented in the economic model
of fragmentation.
,1 io First, when authors join copyright collectives, they "contract into liability rules,"
as they no longer retain a full veto right on the use of their works, which overcomes the
difficulties associated with the commitment and coordination of property rights rules. 241
1 Second, intermediaries hold a certain authority and practical ability to set
prices .242 Copyright collectives and other intermediaries often retain the independent
power to specify prices for individual transactions. Copyright intermediaries regularly
engage in third degree price discrimination, charging different prices to various broad
categories of licensees (e.g., profit/non-profit, number of seats in a venue, number of
listeners of the radio station, voltage, etc.).243 When selling copyrighted products that are
complementary inputs, the intermediary chooses prices that are lower than the prices
copyright holders would have chosen if pricing independently from one another. The
salient point is that the lower price charged by the intermediary is beneficial to all
individual copyright sellers, because it allows them to maximize the total profit from the
sale of their licenses, improving upon the alternative anticommons result reached in the
240. LESSIG, supra note 30, at 241-58. See also Gordon, supra note 88; O'Rourke, Rethinking
Remedies, supra note 166 (because intellectual property increasingly involves contracts and commercial
transactions, U.C.C. damage remedies should, in most cases, take priority over injunction as the default
remedy).
241.

See Merges, Contractinginto Liability Rules, supra note 28.

242. On the license terms and contractual setting of the main performance rights organizations in
music, the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers ("ASCAP") and Broadcast Music, Inc.
("BMI"), see Francesco Parisi & Ben Depoorter, The Market for Copyrights: The Price Theory of
Copyright Collectives, in THE ECONOMICS OF COPYRIGHT: DEVELOPMENTS IN RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS

(Wendy J. Gordon & Richard Watts eds., 2003).
243. For further reference, see American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, at
http://www.ascap.com. To be more precise, as a matter of law, copyright collectives such as ASCAP and
BMI do not have exclusivity in the sale of copyright licenses. Recent antitrust rulings require copyright
owners to retain the ability to issue licenses ("direct licenses") for their work. When involving
"complements," owners have no incentive to deviate unilaterally from the coordinated pricing equilibrium
induced by the intermediary. Owners will not be able to sell for more than the collectives' equilibrium price
and, given the complementarity of the licenses, they have no incentive to sell for less. The competition
between source and intermediary licenses would thus have no effect on the equilibrium price. The antitrust
provisions on this point are therefore ineffective. See Parisi & Depoorter, supra note 242.
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absence of price coordination. 244 The paradox - that the intermediaries' price is lower
than one that would have been chosen by the owners and yet it increases their total profits
from the sale - can be understood by recalling that the anticommons equilibrium pricing
is the direct outcome of a "prisoner's dilemma" that individual copyright holders face
when pricing copyrights independently. While individual sellers could not coordinate
prices, intermediaries overcome the anticommons deadweight losses, providing a benefit
for society as well as for the owners. 245
D. Trademark Law
1. Legal Exclusivity of Trademarks
Trademark protection prevents consumer confusion on the market by encouraging
competitors to use distinctive marks to identify their goods and services.246 The
244. The question arises whether the analysis applies also to tying practices. ASCAP and other
comparable performance rights institutions only offer blanket licenses (covering the right to perform the
collective's entire repertory) and to a small extent per-program licenses (a blanket license covering use of
the repertory in a specific radio or television program, while requiring the user to keep track of the use). As
a practical matter, per-program licenses are rendered unattractive by ASCAP and BMI, because of a
cumbersome procedure and the threatened enforcement of non-intentional infringement. Also, it is
questionable whether source and direct licenses provide alternatives to the preeminent system of blanket
licenses in performing rights. The viability of source licenses is hampered, for syndicates generally tend to
split off performance rights to the collective performing rights associations, while original copyright
holders are reluctant to license their works individually. In fact, the collectives have objected to anything
but blanket licenses and have been ostensibly unwilling - despite efforts by the antitrust authorities - to
move toward item-specific licenses (e.g., the right to use a particular song once). The most obvious
explanation for this reluctance lies in arguments for saving transaction costs. See Stanley M. Besen et al.,
An Economic Analysis of Copyright Collectives, 78 VA. L. REv. 383 (1992). The analysis above provides
an additional rationale for the strategy of collectives with regard to blanket licenses. By tying all licenses
together, copyright collectives are able to shield their market power from the potential competition of
individual source licenses. Tying, in other words, is instrumental to the sustainability of the concentrated
monopolistic pricing of the copyright collectives. Bearing in mind the previous discussion, this has dual
effects from an efficiency point of view. In the "complements" case, this prevents the tragic outcome of the
anticommons pricing. However, in the "substitutes" case, this has the effect of preventing desirable
competition. The traditional concern of tying should thus be reappraised in light of the beneficial effects of
"packaging" complementary goods, to avoid the undesirable pricing problems discussed above. At first
impression, bundling may be the result of the successful coordination of suppliers of complementary goods,
who have overcome the hold-out strategies that generate the complementary oligopoly problem.
245. Opposite conclusions are reached in the case of substitutes. Here, an intermediary with
independent price-fixing authority renders monopolistic pricing sustainable in a Nash equilibrium. The
resulting equilibrium favors copyright owners, who are able to maximize total profit from the sale of their
licenses, as would happen in a cartel. But such coordination is socially inefficient compared to the
alternative competitive (or oligopolistic) equilibrium, because it prevents beneficial competition with the
creation of a social deadweight loss.
246. See, e.g., the United States federal trademark statute, Lanham Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, 60
Stat. 427 (1946) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127). With regard to European Community
Trademarks, proprietors are entitled to "prevent all third parties ... from using in the course of trade ... any

sign which is identical with the Community trade mark in relation to goods or services which are identical
with those for which the Community trade mark is registered." Council Regulation 40/94 on the
Community Trademark, art. 9, 1994 O.J. (L 011) 1 [hereinafter Community Trademark Regulation]. See
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economizing function of a trademark or brand name is the exclusivity of the right itself.
For a trademark to have value it cannot be duplicated. Allowing another company to use
the same brand would remove the original brand's identifying function, thereby
eliminating its value. 247 Much of substantive trademark law can be explained in this light.
For example, in U.S. trademark law, sales and licenses of trademarks are restricted, 248
and any sale must be followed by monitoring for quality compliance. 249
Injunction is the default remedy for trademark infringements.250 Courts will weigh
the individual facts of the case and consider whether equity demands an injunction,
taking into consideration factors such as intent, public interest considerations,251
legislative intent, harm suffered by the plaintiff, balance of hardships, etc. "Irreparable
injury is presumed" when a plaintiff "demonstrate[s] a likelihood of success on [its]
trademark infringement claim," so courts regularly issue preliminary injunctions
prohibiting the further display and other uses of the infringing trademark. 252
2. The Social Costs of Trademarks
Do trademarks raise concerns from the viewpoint of economic fragmentation?
1 115 To a certain extent, trademark owners can prevent the use of a mark in criticism
or comedy pieces by artists, authors and political groups, news agencies, and so forth.
Some have held that the threat of litigation by trademark owners may "have a chilling
also First Directive 89/104/EEC of the Council of 21 December 1988 to Approximate the Laws of the
Member States Relating to Trade Marks, 1988 O.J. (L 40) 1 [hereinafter Trademark Directive].
247. Possible costs of trademarks are that they induce owners to spend on advertising and the
promotion of a spurious image of high quality that enables monopoly rents by deflecting consumers from
lower priced but equal quality substitutes. However, the conception of trademarks as artificial monopoly
has largely been discredited in the economic literature. It is often assumed that consumers are willing to
pay a premium for the assurance that a product with a certain chemical formula will be actually
manufactured along the formula. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, TrademarkLaw: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269, 274-275 (1987).

248. Sale in gross is prohibited; see Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1060. By contrast, most European
countries allow the assignment of trademarks, even without transfer of the underlying business. The
Registry Office can refuse the transfer if it would lead to consumer confusion regarding the trade origin of
the good or services. See TRITTON, supra note 7, at 294. This also applies to community trademarks
("CTM"). A CTM can be assigned "separately from any transfers of the undertaking." Community
Trademark Regulation, supra note 246, at art. 17.
249. See MERGES, NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE, supra note 16, at 698-99; Mark Lemley, The Law and
Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111, 134-35 (1999).

250. For dilution, see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2): "[T]he owner of a famous mark shall be entitled only to
injunctive relief ...." See also O'Rourke, Rethinking Remedies, supra note 166, at 1146-47: "injunction is
the weapon primarily designed to enforce the property right to exclude established under the Patent and
Copyright Acts and to protect the public from confusion under the Lanham Act. The injunction, common in
intellectual property cases, may be used at virtually any stage of the proceedings to stop infringement"
(footnote omitted). On the conflict between property rule protection of copyright law and the First
Amendment, see Gordon, supra note 88.
251. See Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 736 F.2d 1153 (7th Cir. 1984).
252. See, e.g., Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 89 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1164 (C.D. Cal.
2000) aff'd without opinion, 246 F.3d 675 (9th Cir. 2000).

Vol. 9

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF LAw & TECHNOLOGY

No. 4

2004

Depoorter, The Sewral Lius ofMidceyMouse ExpandingIntledl Propt Law

58

effect on speech that happens to involve trademarks" 253 and thus places control of the
shape of discourse in the hands of a few. 254 Familiar words cannot be used widely for
political and social commentary and are no longer freely subject to humor or criticism.255
Others believe that the costs of exclusivity over words and symbols hardly
outweigh the benefits for consumers. As one commentator notes, "the English language
has more than one million words, most of which are under-utilized and wide-open, and
each year probably more new words are being created freely than subtracted
commercially."256

The anticommons problem is largely reduced when one considers trademark law's
provisions on "generic trademarks." The trademark law doctrine of generic marks
restricts exclusive control on both an ex ante and ex post level. Trademark protection is
terminated when the value of a trademark become so commonplace that it attains the
status of a "generic" trademark. 257 Under this restriction a word cannot and will no longer
be adopted as a trademark when the term refers or has primarily become understood by
the consuming public as referring to a product category.258 This preempts many of the
public discourse concerns regarding the excessive control rights of trademark owners.
E. Current Issues in Intellectual Property Law
The previous section underlines the wide-ranging effects of the expansion of
intellectual property rights in patent, copyright and trademark law. This section further
documents the close connection between the issue of fragmentation and the various
questions that are at stake in the policy debates that currently surface in the field of
intellectual property rights.
The two current issues in the societal debate of intellectual property in this section
are the appropriate role of patent protection in genetic and biomedical material, and the
protection of Internet business methods. Both these issues are prime examples where
underlying economic conditions have pushed the expansive boundaries of patent law.

253. Lemley, Death of Common Sense, supra note 42, at 1712. Trademark law may also shape the
portrayal of our landscapes. Landowners have claimed trademark rights in their buildings to protect the
design of these buildings, and to prevent uncompensated depiction of these buildings in whatever form.
Some examples include the trademark granted to the fagade of the New York Stock Exchange or the
litigation on the shape of a golf course. Id. at 1712, nn.136-40 (reference to the relevant trademarks and
case law).
254. Id. at 1712.
255. Id. at 1696.
256. Eli Noam, Two Cheers for the Commodification of Information, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF
INFORMATION 54 (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel eds., 2002).
257. The classic treatment is Ralph H. Folsom & Larry L. Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, 89
YALE L.J. 1323 (1980) (proposing an improved economic test for evaluating genericness).
258. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127. See also Trademark Directive, supra note 246, at art. 3(1)(a) and (d).
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1. Patents on Genetic and Biotechnological Material: From Public to
Private Ownership of Organisms and Information
Prior to the 1980s, living organisms, even when modified, were equated with
"products of nature." 259 This definition of biotechnological or genetic material as nonpatentable subject matter held most genetic material firmly outside of the sphere of patent
law .260

More recently, changes in economic undercurrents and the role of such research 261
has placed pressure on the legal system, the courts in particular, to acknowledge patent
claims primarily based on discoveries of DNA sequences.262
Gradually, and decisively after Diamond v. Chakrabarty,263 patents have been
issued on isolated and purified DNA sequences (separate from the chromosome in which
they occur in nature) and on DNA sequences spliced into recombinant vectors or
introduced into recombinant cells of a sort that did not exist in nature.264 Subsequently,
259. See, e.g., In re Mancy, 499 F.2d 1289, 1294 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (regarding a strain of microorganisms found in a soil sample).
260. A genome is the comprehensive genetic make-up of an organism, consisting of DNA. Discoveries
of DNA sequences contain cloned genes that enable the production of proteins through recombinant DNA
technology.
261. Research in genetic material has surged over the past decade. In 1990 the United States launched
the Human Genome Project (funded by the Department of Energy and the National Institutes of Health)
which intended to identify all genes that constitute our genome, to determine the sequence of the genome's
chemical bases, and to license the pursuant related technologies in the private sector. As of June 2000, the
working draft of the genome has been available (and was completed in 2002). The availability of a genome
sequence has provided a challenging and unique opportunity of further research toward the linking of new
data to medical explanations for diagnostic and therapeutic purposes. The potential development of new
therapeutics and diagnostic and commercially successful products and applications opened the horizon of
research in this area. With the availability of the sequence, research now begins to analyze the raw
sequence to determine the parts of the genome that encode genes, the areas of transcription, and the
functional products that the genes encode. Such research hopes to bring to the fore the downstream
commercial applications that might revolutionize medical treatments. For further information, see FiveYear Plan Goes to Capitol Hill, HUMAN GENOME NEWS, May 1990, available at http://www.ornl.gov/
sci/techresources/HumanGenone/publicathgn/v2nl/04five.shtnl. Research into life forms such as that
covered by agricultural patents has diverse applications in such areas as food consumption, genetically
engineered plants and organisms, new medications, and environmental disease.
262. In 2001, 20,000 to 50,000 gene patents were pending for review at the patent office. Bradshaw,
supra note 117, at 640. The U.S. Patent Office attempted to slow down the tide of patent applications for
routinely generated DNA fragments, called expressed sequence tags (ESTs), which are not genes, but
merely parts of a gene, by issuing a set of Utility Examination Guidelines on January 5, 2001.
263. In Diamond v. Chakrabarty,447 U.S. 303 (1980), the Supreme Court validated a patent claim on
human-made, genetically-engineered bacterium capable of breaking down multiple components of crude
oil. This case compounded the judicial treatment of artificial variants of naturally occurring substances. It
cleared the way for the patent protection of biotechnological innovations such as genetically modified
organisms and proteins. Patent applications for biotechnological and genetic material need to comply with
patent law's minimum standards of novelty, non-obviousness, utility and enablement. Also, in Europe, the
protection for biotechnological inventions has been strengthened. After much back and forth between the
European Commission and the European Parliament, a directive was adopted on the protection of
biotechnological inventions. See Biotech Directive, supra note 222.
264. Eisenberg, Role of Patents,supra note 114, at 786.
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patents have been granted on a variety of biotechnological products and processes.265 In
effect, patents on the gene of a protein provide exclusivity in the market for the
protein. 266
Most recent technological advancements have structurally altered the design of
research in the field of genetics and genomics. 267 Instead of cloning particular genes, the
research and development objective has shifted to the more ambitious task of sequencing
entire genomes.268 This represents a shift in the innovation (and patent) specter from new
chemical entities to new scientific information.269 This paradigmatic shift in genetic
research will be discussed more extensively below.
Due to technological advances, information itself has retained important
commercial value,270 increasing the stakes in the assignment of rights to the information.
From an evolutionary perspective, the drive for "propertization" can thus be readily
explained in reference to the evolutionary theory developed in Part II.C.2. New scientifictechnological advances have provided economic opportunities in the development of pure
genetic information. Because genetic information has become a valuable commodity,
demands for property rights protection arise in earlier stages of the innovation process.
a. Information Patents and Anticommons Dangers
Awarding patent claims on information itself, as opposed to the product
assembled on the basis of this information, is a significant departure from the traditional
understanding of the patent system. Under the conventional bargain of patents, patent law
provides exclusivity in the products that are based on the information itself.271 A
monopoly right is awarded in return for the disclosure of that information and the free
use of the information about the invention for the purpose of innovation, rather than use

265. Biological material which is isolated from its natural environment or produced by means of a
technical process is patentable, even if it previously existed in nature. See Implementing Regulations to the
Convention on the Grant of European Patents, European Patent Convention, R. 23c(a), available at
http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/e/ma2.html.
266. This is similar to a chemical compound that is vital to a drug.
267.

Eisenberg, Role of Patents,supra note 114, at 784.

268. A patent holder's right to exclude others from using a specific set of intangible genetic
information traditionally covers genetic information in a physical form, such as molecules of DNA, RNA,
or proteins. See Bradshaw, supra note 117, at 639-40.
269. Eisenberg, Role of Patents, supra note 114, at 785. For an in depth treatment, see Golden, supra
note 120. Golden calls for continued government involvement and investment in innovation, coupled with a
stricter enforcement of the utility requirements as a condition for patentability.
270. The commercial value of abstract genetic information has changed over time. "In the early days
of patenting genes, the commercial value of genetic information derived not from the control of the
information itself, but from control over its embodiment in the form of a tangible composition of matter i.e. proteins." Bradshaw, supra note 117, at 641.
271. On the social and ethical questions of genetic research, see, e.g., E. RICHARD GOLD, BODY PARTS:
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS (1996); TIMOTHY CAULFIELD
& BRYN WILLIAMS-JONES, THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF GENETIC RESEARCH: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND
POLICY ISSUES (1999).
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of the tangible invention itself.272 When patent rights are granted in the information itself,
the disclosure requirement of patent law is defeated. This establishes private rights of
exclusion in information, while previously only the concrete output of the information
was included in the patent bundle of rights. 273 Awarding exclusivity in the information
itself, even when contained in computer-readable media, is especially problematic
because of the absence in patent law of safeguards such as fair use and reverse
engineering, and because of the more limited experimental usage exception of patent law.
The fragmentation effect of this shift is highlighted in the case of genome
companies. The genomic industry seeks commercial applications for genome data. It
invests in discovering and patenting genes that are useful for the development of
commercially viable products. Its business consists of selling the access rights to
sequence information, drugs, diagnostic tools, and development. In these cases property
rights are established at a very early stage.274
Yet, genetic research is a "cumulative endeavor [where] [t]he work of
downstream researchers depends on access to upstream discoveries."275 This especially
rings true in the field of genomics. Given the fragmented nature of the research industry,
downstream products are likely to rest upon various materials subject to private property
rights in the portfolio of various individual rights holders.

272. The large costs of research and development are held as the primary justification for the patent
system. Production costs of a new drug using chemicals to pharmaceuticals average U.S. $500 million. See
PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA, PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROFILE
2001: R&D - THE KEY TO INNOVATION (2001), available at http://www.phrma.org/publications/

publications/admin/2001-08-05.507.pdf. See also Eisenberg, Role of Patents,supra note 114, at 797. Patent
rights address the considerable gap between (1) up-front costs of developing and establishing a valuable
and proven drug for the market, and (2) the lower costs of copying a drug, by allowing the innovator to
enjoin competitors from all use of the claimed invention, and enabling above-market prices during the
statutorily-provided period of monopoly. For innovative development, see D.C. MOWERY & NATHAN
ROSENBERG, TECHNOLOGY AND THE PURSUIT OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 293-94 (1989). But see E. Richard
Gold, Biomedical Patents and Ethics: A CanadianSolution, 45 McGILL L.J. 413, 423 (2000) (arguing that

the incentive-based justifications of patents are "mere acts of faith based on uncertain or self-serving
empirical evidence").
273. The patenting of genetic material has received criticism. There is a recognition that market
failures in the transfers will be costly. See Adam Bryant & Gregory Beals, Who Will Own the Code of
Life?, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 10, 2000, at 67.
274. Alexander K. Haas, The Wellcome Trust's Disclosures of Gene Sequence Data into the Public
Domain and the Potentialfor ProprietaryRights in the Human Genome, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 145, 150
(2001). Cf Arti Kaur Rai, Evolving Scientific Norms and IntellectualProperty Rights: A Reply to Kieff, 95

Nw. U. L. REV. 707 (2001) (discussing the extensive patenting that occurs at major research universities,
pointing to a norm that disfavours private property rights in high upstream research, such as gene fragments
(ESTs) of unknown function). See also Robert P. Merges, PropertyRights Theory and the Commons, supra

note 16 (describing science as a limited access commons that combines sharing norms among pure
scientists with property rights enforcement against commercial entities).
275. Bradshaw, supra note 117, at 642. The most recent innovation is the arrival of "automated highthroughput" sequencing techniques which enable scientists to process large quantities of raw genomic data
for which no use is known. Expressed sequence tags (ESTs) are sets of chemical base pairs that identify
codes for protein regions with unrevealed biological functions. The pairs are valuable as they may lead to
the code of protein products. Id.
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The anticommons problem is especially daunting in the field of expressed
sequence tags ("ESTs"), where gene fragments have been patented without any
knowledge as to their biological function. "[P]atent holders of these fragments own
overlapping sections of the same gene. Creation of commercially viable products is likely
to require the use of multiple gene fragments." 276
Property rights in genes of unknown functions are problematic. A researcher who
investigates a disease or clinical disorder in relation to a particular gene will need to seek
licenses from each of the patent rights holders of the various possible explanatory ESTs
or single nucleotide polymorphisms ("SNPs"). In cases of increased uncertainty as to the
synergetic effect of one's own research and the to-be-licensed material, the prospective
licensee might forego the intended research. The high degree of uncertainty in the
research on gene patents of uncertain use is thus an argument against the propertization of
such subject matter, in light of the economic model of fragmentation.277
The American Society of Human Genetics describes the problem as follows:
Normally, a patent ensures that a gene will be available for
all researchers and for any company willing to license it.
We fear that in the case of ESTs it may have quite the
opposite effect. An EST patent, to be useful to the
commercial sector, must make broad claims in regard to
future use, including protection for the rest of the gene and
its protein product, and their use for diagnostic and
therapeutic applications. The academic community is
unlikely to put major research effort into an EST-identified
gene or its protein product if someone else already has the
right to license its use based on the trivial effort required to
sequence the original EST. In the commercial sector there
may be reluctance to invest heavily in further research on
EST-identified genes when a small but unknown fraction of
them will turn out to have commercial utility, and when the
useful ones may be contested by patents involving other
ESTs from the same gene. Genome research could end at
the level of ESTs.278
276. Haas, supra note 274, at 160. Cf Remigius N. Nwabueze, Biotechnology and the New Property
Regime in Human Bodies and Body Parts,24 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 19 (2002) (property rights
allow for better protection).
277. But see Kieff, supra note 60, arguing that current patent law would not block full use of the gene
in such circumstances. In a response, Rai cites John Doll, director of biotechnology examination at the
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO): "The USPTO views this situation as analogous to having a patent on a
picture tube. The picture tube patent does not preclude someone else from obtaining a patent on a television
set. However, the holder of the picture tube patent could sue the television set makers for patent
infringement if they use the patented picture tube without obtaining a license." See Rai, supra note 274, at
711.

278. American Society of Human Genetics, American Society of Human Genetics Position Paper on
Patenting of Expressed Sequence Tags, Nov. 1991, available at http://www.faseb.org/genetics/
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b. Safeguards against Patents in Information
In responding to the dangers of fragmentation we may envisage devices that
prevent fragmentation (the ex ante level) or solutions that correct some of the problems
(the ex post level).

(1) Ex Ante Prevention
Several aspects of patent law might provide a counterbalance against the wasteful
effects of over-fragmentation in the context of genetic research.
A gene patent provides the right to exclude others from making, using or selling
the physical molecule, but it does not preempt others from "perceiving, using, and
analyzing information about what the DNA sequence is."279
134 A certain consensus has emerged in the patent community that genes should
remain unpatentable unless the concrete use of the genes can be described.280 As a
normative corollary, in the stage of sequencing genes, the genes will be unpatentable
matter.281 The Human Genome Project, the international project that maps all human
genes, is an interesting example of non-patent incentive conducted research. 282

An intermediate step is to award patents that provide less extensive control rights
to the proprietor. For instance, exclusivity could be granted for more narrow aspects of
the right of use in an invention or non-exclusive license rights over a larger field of uses.
Such more limited monopoly rights would reduce the amount of exclusivity in the bundle
of rights of the patent holder, but might still suffice as incentives for biomedical
investments.

ashg/policy/pol-08.htm. See also Mark D. Adams et al., Complementary DNA Sequencing: Expressed
Sequence Tags and Human Genome Project,252 SCIENCE 1651 (1991).
279. Bradshaw, supra note 117, at 642 (with reference to Eisenberg, Role of Patents, supra note 114,
at 788).
280. Consider in this regard the activities of The Wellcome Trust ("WT"). The WT is the world's
largest medical charity organization, consisting of a dozen of public and private institutions involved in
human genome research, with the "aim of improving human and animal health." At the "Strategy Meetings
on Human Genome Sequencing" in Bermuda on issues of sequencing strategy, policy, and data
dissemination, the Bermuda Agreement was concluded. The most essential findings are that (i) raw
sequence should be freely available in the public domain, with a priority accorded to disclosure of raw
genome as soon as possible; and (ii) proprietary rights should be limited to the "useful benefits derived
from genetic information." See The Wellcome Trust, Summary of PrinciplesAgreed at the International
Strategy Meeting on Human Genome Sequencing, Feb. 25-28, 1996, available at http://

www.gene.ucl.ac.uk/hugo/bermuda.htm. See also Haas, supra note 274, at 163.
281. Gold, supra note 272.
282. For a critical examination of the proof of the stimulating effect of patents on investment levels,
citing the Human Genome Project as a counterexample, see Gold, supra note 272, at 428. In a recent
project, pharmaceutical companies have contributed half of the budget for a public-private venture that is
putting single nucleotide polymorphism ("SNP") research into the public domain. See Nicholas Wade, 10
Drug Makers Join in Drive to Find Diseases' Genetic Roots, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1999 (cited in Rai,

supra note 274, at 712 n.35).
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(2) Ex Post Correction
The recent developments in genetic research have led some scholars to propose
institutional responses that counter some of the problems resulting from fragmented
ownership of patent. These institutions include open genetic database archives and
cooperative cross licensing initiatives, such as those employed in the computer
industry. 283
Some have found in favor of more stringent regulation of the exercise of control
by patent holders.284 Others propose a registration system of ESTs, which would provide
a short exclusive period, followed by a period of compulsory licensing of the right to
conduct research on the EST, ending with entry into the public domain. 285
c. Conclusion
For the purpose of resource allocation efficiency, the appropriate balance cannot
be determined by comparing a system of patent law protection (innovation is encouraged
but with anticommons costs) to a system where there is no patent protection (lowered
incentives for investment but no anticommons losses). Rather, the correct comparison is
between a system of patent protection and an alternative system of trade secrecy where
there is no (protected) disclosure and where independent invention is predominant. More
generally, in the absence of patent law, the protection of investment will be obtained via
alternative means. This is exemplified by the research and development in the area of
DNA sequencing in both the public and private sector in the historical absence of any
certainty with regard to capture of the informational value of these investments. 286
When conducting comparative institutional analysis, 287 the relevant answers do
not reveal themselves though a singular comparison of "innovation with patent
protection" versus "innovation without patent protection," but instead follow from a
measurement of "innovation with patent protection" as compared with innovation under
alternative means of protection.
1

The economic model of fragmentation details some of the problems that might
occur when attempting to reunify information fragments that are held by separate
individuals. As such the economic theory of fragmentation deserves recognition as one
important part of the patent puzzle. The issue demands further empirical investigation of
283. Bradshaw, supra note 117, at 659 (finding in favor of regulation of gene patent law at the postissuance stage).
284. Id.
285. See Haas, supra note 274, at 163. The analysis of copyright collectives, in supra Part III.C.4,
applies to this proposal. But see discussion in supra Part III.B.4: "Unlike copyrighted works, patents do not
lend themselves well to pooling by intermediaries. Licensing patents in bulk is extremely difficult because
of the more complicated nature of patents and inventions. In particular, improvements are hard to
categorize."
286.

Eisenberg, Role of Patents,supra note 114, at 795.

287.
See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994).
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the market of licensing and the incentive effects of patents.
2. Business Methods
a. The Extension of Patents to Methods
Most recently, United States patent doctrine has begun to treat business methods
as patentable subject matter. 288 Originally, business methods were regarded as outside of
the scope of intellectual property law. Business methods were considered as non-statutory
subject matter or rejected because of lack of novelty, non-obviousness or the business
method exception.289
Because of the low entry barriers for conducting business online, business
methods have become crucial assets for attracting customers online. Patents on these
business methods provide far-stretching rights of exclusivity and exclusion in business
models. The "reverse auction" patent of Priceline.com provides its owner with
exclusivity over all business methods that use pricing systems in which buyers propose a
price and suppliers bid by auction for the supply of the good or service at that price. A
patent such as that held by Netcentives provides exclusivity to frequent-buyer programs
on the Internet, and the Cybergold patent monopolizes pay-per-view advertising. 290
To many, this turnaround in the treatment of business methods291 is yet another
significant step toward the enclosure of the public domain in the wake of the information

288. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1596 (Fed. Cir. 1998). State Street concerned a system that enhanced sale effects and tax benefits by
pooling individual mutual funds' assets into larger partnership-based investment portfolios. For a critique,
see DiMatteo, supra note 35; Leo J. Raskind, The State Street Bank Decision: The Bad Business of
Unlimited Patent Protectionfor Methods of Doing Business, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.

L.J. 61 (1999) (business patents do not engender economic incentives and might deter diffusion of those
methods). See also Bartow, supra note 36; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad
for Business?, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263 (2000); Merges, Six Impossible
Patents, supra note 8; Richard H. Stem, Scope-of-Protection Problems with Patents and Copyrights on
Methods of Doing Business, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 105 (1999); John R. Thomas,
The Post-IndustrialPatent System, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 3 (1999) (the strict

application of the industrial application requirement can restore the balance by limiting patent protection to
repeatable production and transformation of material objects); John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the
Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REv. 1139 (1999).

289. See, e.g., Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908) (methods of
doing business are ineligible for patent protection); Loew's Drive-In Theaters, Inc. v. Park-In Theaters,
Inc., 174 F.2d 547 (1st Cir. 1949) (scheme for parking automobiles in an open lot held not patentable); Ex
parte Murray, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1819 (Bd. Pat. App. 1988) (accounting analysis of expenses held not
patentable); In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 296 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J., dissenting) (method of
competitive bidding on multiple items held not patentable).
290. These examples are borrowed from Jared Earl Grusd, Internet Business Methods: What Role Does
and Should PatentLaw Play?, 4 VA. J.L. & TECH. 9, 5 (1999).

291. Some attribute this expansion to the protection of software, which empowered creative lawyers to
push the limit by describing business methods as new combinations of hardware and software. See Merges,
Six Impossible Patents, supra note 8, at 586.
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economy.292 It has been argued that granting patents to business methods fits within a
broader extension whereby consideration is given to secondary factors such as the
financial success of a commercialized invention, the number of licenses that have been
issued on the method, and so forth.293
b. Anticommons Concern
Because business method patents place severe restraints on the business conduct
of competitors, actual and potential,294 they carry the potential of turning the
"superhighway11of electronic commerce ... into a toll road. ,295 The anticommons danger in
this respect is considerable. 296 The Sightsound.com patent, for instance, has the potential
of preventing the sale of any digital audio or video recording over the Internet, if upheld
in court.297 The problem is compounded by the dynamic nature of the Internet. 298
c. Making Sense of the Property Rights in Business Methods
Because entry barriers are so low in cyberspace, it becomes hard to distinguish
292. Grusd, supra note 290 (arguing courts should align prior doctrine with policy concerns when
evaluating patent claims in Internet business methods).
293. For a discussion, see Merges, CommercialSuccess, supra note 41 (the focus on secondary factors
tends to reward non-technical achievements and undermines the patent system).
294. Raskind, supra note 288, at 101-02.
295. Id. at 67.
296. Grusd, supra note 290, at 1 63 (acknowledging the link between proliferated and diversely held
business patents and the dynamic effect of freezing the development of novel business methods).
297. Id. at 127.
298. On the problematic nature of strong intellectual property protection on the Internet, see Lessig:
There is growing skepticism among academics about whether such
state-imposed monopolies help a rapidly evolving market such as the
Internet. What is "novel," "nonobvious" or "useful" is hard enough to
know in a relatively stable field. In a transforming market, it's nearly
impossible for anyone - let alone an underpaid worker in the U.S.
Department of Commerce who spends on average of eight hours
evaluating the prior art in a patent and gets paid based on how many he
processes - to identify what's "novel." Costly mistakes get made. On
average it takes $1.2 million to challenge the validity of a patent, which
means it is often cheaper simply to pay the royalties than to establish
that the patent isn't deserved.
"Bad patents" thus become the space debris of cyberspace. Nowhere is
this clearer than in the context of business-method patents. At a recent
conference in Israel, I watched as a lawyer terrified the assembled
crowd of Internet startups with stories of the increasing number of
business-method patents that now haunt Internet space. Patent No.
5,715,314, for example, gives the holder a monopoly over "networkbased sales systems" - we call that e-commerce. Patent No. 5,797,127
forms the basis for Priceline.com and effectively blocks any
competitor. Patent No. 4,949,257 covers the purchase of software over
a network.
Lessig, supra note 51.
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oneself from the abundance of competitors, which leaves the pioneer with a strong firstmover advantage.2 99 The information paradoxoo increases the importance of being the
first in the market for Internet products or services. This reduces the need for patent
protections; inventors have due incentives to be the pioneering innovator.
On the other hand, licensing is more problematic in the context of business
methods. Because the lines between different markets are blurred in the realm of ecommerce, licensing will be conducted in a less friendly environment. Consider in this
regard the recent lawsuit between a retail giant and an online bookstore.3 0 1 Such lawsuits
are indicative of the exercise of strategic veto rights in valuable resources, which has led
commentators to propose limits on injunctive remedies for business methods. 302
IV.

CONCLUSION

The theory of legal evolution, developed in this article, holds that private property
rights allocations in intellectual property goods result from changes in economic values
that stem from the development of new technology and the opening of new markets. The
uncertainty as to the successfulness of technology in protecting or circumventing
protection of intellectual goods leads to increased efforts of legislative and judicial
capture by both content providers and consumers. This technological uncertainty feeds
into legal uncertainty with regard to the applicability of current intellectual property laws
and the necessity of newly tailored legal rules. In determining the proper scope of
intellectual property law, intellectual property users and developers are at opposite ends
of the spectrum. Holders of intellectual property rights will claim that the new technology
falls within the existing bundle of the intellectual property rights, while end users assert
that the technological change is so significant that contemporary intellectual property
laws do not apply. The resulting social mechanism predicts a cyclical back and forth of
the legal allocation of use rights between producers and users, in which the outcome is
often contingent upon one's interpretation of the technological state of the art. Finally, as
299. However, insofar as the first-mover advantage is premised on network or lock-in effects, the
remarkable economic downturn of the information technology industry over the course of 2000 to 2002
seems to have falsified such a theory. For a theoretical discussion of the exaggeration of the differences
between classical retailing and e-retailing, including network effects, see STAN LIEBOWITZ, RE-THINKING
THE NETWORK ECONOMY (2002). Despite these reservations, the argument remains that, given low entry
barriers and an abundance of unranked information, being first and getting name recognition can provide a
huge short-term advantage. By no means does this imply long-run survival if the quality of the product or
service offered is inferior to that of competitors.
300. The information paradox, as different from Arrow's information paradox, refers to the condition
where an individual is overwhelmed with information, while unable to locate information that is of import
or interest. The paradox lies with the reduced level of information relative to the higher availability of that
information. In the realm of corporate consulting a popular application of the information paradox is the
positive correlation between increased levels of investment by companies in cutting-edge information
technology, and the reduced grasp on the efficiency of these investments. See JOHN THORP, THE
INFORMATION PARADOX (1999).

301.

Grusd, supra note 290, at

61: "traditional lines demarcating different industries erode on the

Internet." See also Bloomberg News Service, Wal-Mart Agrees to Settle Law Suit againstAmazon, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 6, 1999, at C6.
302. Raskind, supra note 288, at 103.
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a matter of allocative efficiency, there exists considerable friction between the "multicomponent" or complementary nature of works and the continued extension of property
rights protection to increasingly smaller units of intellectual and scientific creation.
Economic theory reveals the problematic societal consequences that may develop in the
wake of unbounded fragmentation of property rights.
Rewarding creation and innovation with the allocation of temporary property
rights is the time-honored approach to these developments. The legislative or judicial
conception and assignment of these new property rights are a crucial matter of social
ordering. The outcome of this process determines the control rights in the interaction
between new technology and intellectual property content. This article suggests that
society benefits from qualified conceptions of property rights in intellectual property law.
As the model of fragmentation demonstrates, the uncoordinated exercise by right holders
of their exclusion rights might lead to sub-optimal levels of production. Doctrines of fair
use, blocking patents, equivalent patents, and generic trademarks serve as important
points of moderation of the deadweight losses that might ensue when dealing with the
uncoordinated exercise of control rights over complementary property rights. Practices of
price coordination and mergers resolve strategic pricing problems involving
complements. In light of the anticommons problem, these doctrines and institutions retain
importance as tools that work to the advantage of both producers and consumers of
intellectual property material.
9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4 (2004), at http://www.vjolt.net.
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